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The problem of creditor conduct in a distressed firm—for which policymakers
ought to have the distressed firm’s economically sensible repositioning as a
central goal—has vexed courts for decades. Because courts have not come to
coherent, stable doctrine to regulate creditor behavior and because they do not
focus on building doctrinal structures that would facilitate the sensible reposi-
tioning of the distressed firm, social costs arise and those costs may be substan-
tial. One can easily see why developing a good rule here has been hard to
achieve: A rule that facilitates creditor intervention in the debtor’s operations
beyond the creditor’s ordinary collection on a defaulted loan can induce credi-
tors to intervene perniciously, to shift value to themselves even at the price of
mismanaging the debtor. But a rule that confines creditors to no more than
collecting their debt can allow failed managers to continue mismanaging the
distressed firm, with the only real managerial alternative—the creditor—par-
alyzed by judicial doctrine.
The doctrinal difficulty and the potential for creditor paralysis arise from un-
clear and inconsistent judicial doctrine. Some courts hold that it is the credi-
tor’s inequitable control of the debtor that leads to creditor liability. Others
rule that the creditor’s contract rights go beyond simply suing and collecting,
fully allowing the creditor to condition its own forbearance from suing on the
debtor complying with the creditor’s wishes—even if the conditions are costly
to the firm’s other creditors. Worse for encouraging positive creditor engage-
ment, the doctrinal standard through which courts shift from protected con-
tract rights to perniciously exercised control is obscure. Leading cases have the
same basic facts—sometimes even the same court—but sharply differing re-
sults. Creditor control is the key doctrinal metric, but the better metric for
judicial focus is the creditor’s goal.
Here we show, first, that there is often no on-the-ground, operational differ-
ence between these two standards—pernicious control and free-wheeling con-
tract enforcement—and that this lack of sharp difference helps explain why
the judicial results are vexing, contradictory, and costly. We next show how
similar problems are dealt with differently in corporate law settings: courts
evaluate the questioned transaction but defer to the business judgment of an
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unconflicted board of directors. Then we show how putting a layer of basic
corporate duties—entire fairness for conflicted transactions and business-judg-
ment-rule deferential review for nonconflicted transactions—atop the credi-
tor-intervention doctrines clarifies the creditor-in-control problem and shows
us a conceptual way out from the problem. A safe harbor for creditors is plau-
sible—if courts could reduce the extent of creditor conflict for critical deci-
sions—and would both encourage constructive creditor intervention and
discourage detrimental, value-shifting creditor intervention.
Finally, we show that modern financial markets yield a practical way out,
using this corporate doctrine as the map: modern capital markets’ capacity to
build options, credit default swaps, and contracts for equity calls provides new
mechanisms that, when combined with the classic corporate doctrinal overlay,
can better inform courts and parties on how to evaluate and structure creditor
entry into managerial decisionmaking. The capital market and corporate doc-
trine combination can create a doctrinal conduit to better incentivize capital
market players to improve distressed firms than the current doctrines regulat-
ing creditor conduct.
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Introduction
When firms fail, creditors seek to be repaid. Sometimes, however, a
creditor does more than simply collect on its breached contract, taking con-
trol of the failing firm and dictating the firm’s operating decisions and per-
sonnel choices with the aim of being repaid, perhaps at the expense of other
creditors or of the firm’s well-being. When a creditor does so, litigation can
readily ensue, after the eventual bankruptcy or before it, with other claim-
ants on the firm asserting that the controlling creditor was liable to those
other claimants, or to the firm, if the creditor ran the firm opportunistically
for its own benefit.
For now, it suffices to understand two premises here that we demon-
strate later: namely that, first, courts have treated substantially identical fac-
tual settings differently—sometimes holding creditors liable for a breach of
duty but other times absolving them for nearly identical actions under con-
tractarian thinking—and, second, the results and inconsistencies matter.
They matter because when a firm fails, a large financial creditor is often the
corporate player best positioned to make the needed operational and per-
sonnel decisions that will minimize economic loss and reduce the chance
that the firm goes bankrupt or closes unnecessarily. But if the creditor is
sharply conflicted, then it cannot be trusted to maximize overall value. And,
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because the applicable doctrines that govern a creditor’s acts are both uncer-
tain and not aimed at ameliorating the distressed firm’s operational effi-
ciency, the creditor’s fear of being caught in an unfriendly legal framework
can keep even a nonconflicted creditor far from the firm’s operational deci-
sionmaking, for fear of ex post liability. If courts could find, and we believe
that they can, a doctrinal overlay that encourages constructive creditor en-
gagement while discouraging value-diminishing engagement, the courts
should articulate the doctrine for such a safe harbor.
* * *
Thus we have a substantial economic problem that has not yet settled
into a suitable legal framework, with the judicially built framework that now
exists generating both uncertainty and missed opportunities to restructure
weakened firms. This uncertainty arises not just from disagreeing courts un-
able to settle on correct and consistent doctrine but also from foundational
difficulties embedded in the distressed firm’s situation. Courts regularly in-
dicate that a creditor can enforce its contract without then bearing much
excess fiduciary responsibility, decisions that we examine in Part I. When
courts hold that creditor enforcement of its contract is fair game, they typi-
cally thereby free the creditor from liability even if the creditor directs or
influences the debtor’s decisionmaking on operations and finances. Other
courts indicate that the contract bars the creditor from controlling the
debtor firm with impunity. When the creditor does take control (or as some
courts put it, when it takes day-to-day control), it acquires concomitant fi-
duciary duties, as if it constituted the firm’s board of directors—duties that
typically lead a court to find creditor liability for unfairly furthering its own
interests. When a court does so, it typically orders the controlling creditor’s
claims to be subordinated in bankruptcy to other creditors’ claims, holds the
creditor liable to the debtor, or finds the creditor liable to other creditors.
We examine instances of these contrasting decisions in Section I.A.
One core doctrinal difficulty is that the existing doctrines do not seek to
maximize total firm value. Rather, both doctrines regulate the fairness or the
contractual appropriateness of the creditor’s conduct, without a sharp view
as to whether the doctrines would incentivize better management of the
debtor. A second core doctrinal difficulty is that a line separating legitimate
contract from pernicious control, the two judicial positions, is difficult to
draw. The two positions blur into one another because creditor power, even
the power to control the debtor, emanates from the loan contract.
Take many courts’ focus on the creditor’s having day-to-day control (a
characteristic inducing courts to hold the day-to-day controller liable, as we
describe in Section I.A): a creditor can enrich itself at the expense of other
creditors by inducing a single debtor action. The creditor need not control
the firm day-to-day but can, say, force the liquidation of the firm’s main
factory on a single day, before and after which it does not control the debtor.
Such a creditor may perniciously favor itself but lack the day-to-day control
that some courts look for as a predicate to creditor liability.
October 2013] A Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach 63
Other courts give a creditor carte blanche to enforce its contract,
countenancing creditor action that goes beyond suing to collect from the
debtor—permitting the creditor to instruct or influence the firm’s opera-
tional decisions, sometimes at the expense of other players in the firm. If the
debtor violates the loan contract in a way that allows the creditor to demand
and receive repayment, then the creditor could forgo repayment, reason
such courts, but condition its waiver of the debtor’s default on whether the
debtor agrees to a specified action. Courts that support such conditional
contractual waivers will not second-guess the creditor’s leveraging of its con-
tract into influence or control.
That is, a creditor could want to enforce its contract via selective, condi-
tional waivers that give it de facto day-to-day control and the ability to shift
value to itself. It could leverage its weak position, in which the creditor
would not be fully repaid, into a strong one, in which it is fully repaid.
Courts often say that day-to-day control is pernicious but that creditor self-
protection via the contract is not. But the line separating pernicious creditor
control from protected contract enforcement cannot be drawn precisely, if
at all. In Section I.B, we examine several court decisions that illustrate why
the judicially prevailing control-versus-contract dichotomy is a false one.
This doctrinal overlay for creditor conflict can be usefully compared
with the doctrinal overlay for corporate board conflicts. One contribution of
this Article is to show that business law has two different doctrines gov-
erning substantially similar problems—one for board conflicts and decision-
making and another for creditor conflicts and decisionmaking. We show
how the doctrines are consistent in part and how they are not.
While the current control-based doctrinal dichotomy for creditor con-
duct is a dead end for addressing the failing firm’s operational and manage-
rial difficulties, importing corporate doctrines would in theory allow courts
to doctrinally and conceptually escape from the current creditor-conduct
predicament. But for most of the twentieth century, such a doctrinal trans-
formation would have been theoretical and not grounded in transactional
reality because the corporate doctrines require that the decisionmaker—the
board for corporate decisions, the creditor for distressed debtor interven-
tion—not have significant conflicts of interest, a condition that was plausi-
ble for boardrooms but that could not be created in credit markets or under
bank regulation. But we will show how these results can now be achieved not
just in theory but in transactional reality, by grafting modern capital market
instruments and institutions onto corporate doctrine.
Courts applying corporate law typically defer to boards of directors’
business judgment to run their own firm: as long as a board was operating
professionally, without substantial conflicts of interest, courts will not hold
the board liable to shareholders for board errors of judgment. If the board
will, or could, profit from its business decisions, judicial deference to that
board will not be forthcoming and courts will, in one major formulation,
review the challenged transaction for its entire fairness, burdening the board
with proving that the transaction was “entirely fair.” As we see in Section
II.B, in corporate law, judicial doctrine has long aimed to make the board a
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neutral, unbiased decisionmaker, without substantial conflicts of interest
when making basic business decisions.
Creditor activities, decisions, and influence over the distressed firm re-
semble board-like strategic decisions. Courts could analyze creditor strategic
actions in business-judgment terms, as if the creditor had displaced the
debtor’s board of directors. But courts have had little reason to do so be-
cause it is hard to find that the influential creditor could be anything but
conflicted. As such, the doctrinal detour would end in the same place: an
entire-fairness style review of the creditor’s business decisions, analyzing
whether the creditor’s conflicts justified creditor liability.
Consider the creditor’s goals and how they can be channeled into useful
or deleterious actions. The creditor wants ultimately to be paid. It wants the
firm to be run better and is often well positioned to second-guess manage-
ment of failed firms. But the creditor is typically also prepared to induce the
firm’s managers to liquidate its core operations quickly in a fire sale—even
one that destroys long-run value—if that liquidation pays the creditor in full
but continued operation would risk the firm’s further decline and would
leave the creditor unpaid.
For the moment, this is how, in the abstract, the corporate law concepts
could play out in the controlling-creditor context: even if courts were to
determine that creditors’ assuming board-like control of a debtor firm cre-
ated corporate-style fiduciary duties running to the firm, its stockholders,
and maybe its other creditors, courts would defer to the controlling credi-
tor’s business judgment in influencing the firm, if, but only if, this hypothet-
ical creditor faced no substantial conflicts of interest when exercising that
business judgment. The creditor-based standard would parallel the board-
based business-judgment rule.
The existence of creditors lacking such sharp conflicts would seem to be
more theoretical than real, however, because creditors of distressed firms
seem to be always conflicted. They want to cash out their loan, they want to
cash it out now, not later, and they will destroy firm value to reach that goal.
They prefer an operational decision that cashes them out over one that
leaves them at risk, even if the risky decision is overall better for the firm
and its other creditors. Hence, this creditor conflict-of-interest renders the
corporate-law-based approach into a real-world dead end.
And, for a long time, searching for such a nonconflicted creditor would
have, in fact, been a real-world dead end. The archetypal American lender,
the bank, simply had to be in conflict with other creditors, the debtor, and
the debtor’s stockholders.
But modern capital markets allow us to make the business-judgment
possibility real. Our approach is to harness modern capital markets so that
the creditor’s self-interested biases come to closely parallel the total value of
the corporation, with the creditor’s portion of that value increasing or de-
creasing proportionately with the increase or decrease of the corporation’s
full value. The creditor would still be deeply self-interested, with much
money on the line. But if the creditor’s primary goal is to see the firm better
managed, it could willingly come under this doctrinal umbrella, which
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would lead courts to more willingly protect such properly incentivized credi-
tors in the inevitable subsequent lawsuits.
Modern derivatives markets now make it possible for the creditor in-
volved in the firm’s most basic strategic decisions to acquire derivatives or
options on the firm’s other capital layers. This acquisition would make the
creditor feel the firm’s financial pain from loss, while simultaneously al-
lowing it to obtain the firm’s gains from a sound restructuring of its opera-
tions. By offsetting the creditor’s inherent conflict with an equal and
opposite financial force, courts can reduce the dominant creditor’s inherent
conflict in the distressed firm’s situation. This action would channel the
creditor’s influence into enhancing firm value and away from shifting value
from other claimants to itself. To the extent that the inherent conflict can be
removed via the instruments of the modern capital market, courts can make
the creditor’s incentives approach that of a board seeking to maximize the
firm’s value. Courts that are convinced that the modern capital market in-
struments have been so used should be more ready than we have previously
thought possible to defer to the controlling creditor’s business judgment,
while staying alert to persisting conflicts.
Some creditors would be unwilling to pay the cost of taking up these
other financial interests in the firm. But others would want the freedom to
maneuver operationally in replacing management or inducing the distressed
firm to change its strategic direction. Such creditors could be willing to pay
the costs of taking up these incentivizing financial instruments to avoid be-
ing second-guessed later by the court if and when the firm’s other creditors
sue that creditor. Those that did pay would be buying more room to affect
firm mismanagement because they would thereby acquire a higher level of
business-judgment deference in any subsequent lawsuits. For creditors un-
willing to pay that cost to acquire the safe harbor, the current overinclusive
and underinclusive lender-liability doctrines would continue to govern judi-
cial assessment of their actions.
The holy grail of much corporate law is to find a key decisionmaker who
is both incentivized and not conflicted. Here we put forward the reasons
why current creditor-in-control doctrine gets us neither strong creditor in-
centives for improving the firm nor few conflicts of interest. This is so, de-
spite the fact that modern capital markets can, if harnessed with the correct
judicial doctrinal overlay, move us closer to that holy grail of incentivized,
nonconflicted decisionmaking for a wide range of vital business and finan-
cial transactions.
* * *
A road map for this Article: In Part I, we define the problem, showing
that as a factual matter, courts have long had, and still have, deep difficulties
in distinguishing day-to-day creditor control (which typically leads to liabil-
ity) from simple creditor enforcement of its own contract (which typically
does not). We show that judicial doctrine has not focused on an operational
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goal of turning around otherwise viable firms and repositioning the non-
viable ones quickly. We also show the longstanding contradictions in judicial
opinions, the continuing instability of these opinions in recent years, and the
reasons why no doctrinal solution emanating from current analysis is viable
for real-world decisionmaking.
We also show in Part I the importance of getting the judicial framework
for creditor intervention right. While policymakers should not want con-
flicted creditors running failed firms, they also should not want failed man-
agement to continue running failing firms and mismanaging them while
astute but fearful creditors watch passively. Nor should policymakers want a
controlling creditor to put new people in place in the failing firm to imple-
ment strategies that would overly favor its own narrow interest at the ex-
pense of others in the firm and overall value maximization. Until now,
policymakers have either traded one cost for the other—without simultane-
ously reducing creditor bias and inducing better firm management—or ig-
nored ameliorating firm management as a primary goal for the doctrinal
overlay here. There seemed to be no way that would keep sharply conflicted
creditors away from firm management and at the same time make it easy for
creditors without strong conflicts to influence critical decisionmaking in the
distressed firm.
In Part II, we show that basic corporate law faces a similar problem of
judicial review of boards of directors’ decisions. Corporate law doctrine,
however, points to a conceptual way out from the creditor-in-control di-
lemma. The dominant form of judicial review of board decisionmaking is
business-judgment deference, but only if the directors are not financially
conflicted in their decisionmaking. If the board is conflicted, a court does
not give it business-judgment deference and examines the entire fairness of
the challenged transactions. In theory, many courts reviewing creditor action
can be seen as jumping right to a sort of entire fairness review, because the
creditor’s conflicts were just too deep, extensive, and obvious. The courts
need not stop to assess whether business-judgment review and deference
would have been plausible because it is so hard to imagine that it could be.
But the business-judgment concept nevertheless is conceptually available: if
one could replicate the nonconflicted board in the creditor’s profile, then
courts could encourage constructive creditor engagement with the failing
firm.
In Parts III and IV, we show how capital structure decisions could re-
duce those creditor conflicts to a manageable magnitude, allowing courts to
consider business-judgment deference. We consider in Part III old-style cap-
ital market decisions and their sharp limits here. The bank lending syndi-
cate’s conflicts could be shaped, and reduced, by the bank syndicate leader
taking stock to offset its credit position. While theoretically possible, such
results were practically difficult and legally impossible under American bank
regulation. Elements of the structure did, however, appear in the classic Jap-
anese main bank system in ways that would have been difficult or impossible
to implement under American banking law. But then in Part IV, we show
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how modern derivatives and options, as well as the rise of new institutional
lenders beyond traditional banks, now make this scenario viable.
Thus, we show for the first time that layering corporate law doctrine
atop creditor law (in and out of bankruptcy) points to a doctrinal, theoreti-
cal way out from the basic contradictions in the current doctrines governing
creditor conduct. The doctrinal overlay could provide a safe harbor that
would lead to some creditors being unconflicted (or less conflicted) by hold-
ing proportionate interests in the conflicted capital layers. We then show,
again for the first time, that modern capital markets now have both the
instruments and the nonbanking financial players in place that could yield a
practical way to turn doctrine and theory into on-the-ground, operational
reality. Now is the time for courts to create judicial doctrine that could har-
ness these instruments and incentivize financial players to better business
ends.
I. The Problem
The economic problem is that failing firms can often be turned around,
but that turnaround can be impeded if a firm’s own inside managers and
directors are ill-suited for the task. Outside creditors will often be uninter-
ested in a turnaround but will simply seek to collect whatever they can. Yet,
sometimes major creditors are well positioned to assess the distressed firm’s
managerial capacity and business model. These creditors may believe that a
differently managed firm would be worth more for all. And they may want
to influence or replace the firm’s management because they want to maxi-
mize their own recovery by making the firm more valuable. But the judicial
doctrinal overlay sitting atop this business problem is not well constructed
to encourage functional creditor conduct. Doctrine will deter some well-
motivated creditors from acting, influencing, and controlling because active
creditors will not know how their conduct will be measured.
Courts analyze these activist creditor-in-control situations in differing
ways: under doctrines of good faith and gap filling of the creditor’s contract
with the debtor and its other creditors;1 under doctrines of instrumentality
or alter ego, by which the firm is deemed to be an instrument of the credi-
tor;2 under similar doctrines with the creditor and firm in a newly created
agency relationship (under which a controlling lender is seen as the debtor’s
principal, responsible for its agent’s wrongs);3 under bankruptcy equitable
1. E.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357
(7th Cir. 1990).
2. See Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1106
(5th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he control required for liability under the ‘instrumentality’ rule amounts
to total domination of the subservient corporation, to the extent that the subservient corpora-
tion manifests no separate corporate interests of its own and functions solely to achieve the
purposes of the dominant corporation.”). See generally infra Section I.A.2.
3. E.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 1981).
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subordination doctrines;4 via fiduciary duties (which arise from the creditor
becoming a de facto or de jure director or controlling shareholder of the
failing firm);5 or under newer tort doctrines of liability for facilitating a
deepening insolvency of the firm.6
The overall doctrinal problem is as follows: courts dealing with activist
creditors in troubled firms often say that (1) creditors who take day-to-day
control of their debtors assume board-like duties to the firm’s stockholders
and its other creditors,7 and (2) creditors can enforce their loan agreements
to protect their own interests.8 These contradictory standards for judicial
decisionmaking confuse creditors and firms, disabling creditors’ counsel
from being able to advise potentially powerful creditors well because the two
standards merge and overlap but lead to opposite outcomes. A creditor may
lack day-to-day control but could pressure the debtor to favor the influential
creditor over other creditors. The self-interested pressure can induce a single
but powerful debtor decision, or the debtor’s managers may feel creditor
pressure that is short of full creditor control but that influences day-to-day
outcomes, from decision to decision. Yet one judicial standard focuses on
the differences between day-to-day creditor control, which the standard
deems pernicious, and control that is intermittent and more in the nature of
influence, which the standard deems to be innocent. Conversely, a creditor
may take day-to-day control, directly or by putting a new management team
in place, but do so to run the firm more efficiently than failed incumbent
management. In that situation, the controlling creditor may never oppor-
tunistically favor itself over the firm’s other creditors but seek only to maxi-
mize firm value (which the controlling creditor expects will allow it to be
repaid). But with day-to-day control, the creditor still puts itself at legal risk.
The analogous contractarian thinking is here no better at inducing
value-enhancing creditor incentives. The creditor might go beyond suing
and collecting on its contract; it might also use its contract to protect its
interests by waiving the debtor’s loan covenant defaults daily, declining to
demand repayment of its loan even though the debtor has failed to maintain
4. E.g., Bergquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Am. Lumber Co.), 5 B.R. 470, 478 (D. Minn.
1980).
5. E.g., Smith v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893 F.2d
693, 702 (5th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Clark Pipe & Supply II].
6. E.g., OHC Liquidation Trust v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Oakwood Homes
Corp.), 340 B.R. 510 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
7. E.g., Badger Freightways, Inc. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Badger
Freightways, Inc.), 106 B.R. 971, 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (“If the lending institution usurps
the power to make business decisions from the customer’s board of directors and officers, then
it must also undertake the fiduciary obligation that the officers and directors owe the corpora-
tion . . . .”); In re Beverages Int’l Ltd., 50 B.R. 273, 280–82 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (stating that
“where the creditor exercises control over or domination of the debtor, his dealings with the
debtor are subject to strict scrutiny. The burden is on an insider claimant to show the inherent
fairness and good faith of the challenged transaction” and that “[w]here a creditor has taken
control of the debtor, he assumes the fiduciary duties of management and a duty to deal fairly
with other creditors”).
8. E.g., Clark Pipe & Supply II, 893 F.2d at 695.
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its part of the bargain. The creditor’s decision to waive the debtor’s default
would, however, be based on whether the debtor is recovering its economic
well-being (which could be good for all creditors)—for example, by reduc-
ing unnecessary expenses and removing unsuitable managers—or on
whether the debtor is enriching the favored creditor each day at the expense
of other creditors, such as by converting free, unsecured inventory into ac-
counts receivable pledged to the lender as security. Some contractarian
courts say that leveraging the contract into such influence does not entail
controlling the corporation, its management, or its operations.9
The doctrinal situation is thus operationally contradictory. And here,
getting the rules right can make an acute operational difference. When a
firm fails, it often takes time to replace incumbent management, often re-
quiring a costly bankruptcy to do so.10 Creditors may be better positioned
than the board and the firm’s stockholders to do so efficaciously and
quickly, with the creditors sometimes being less conflicted in their decision-
making than the incumbent managers. Or sometimes a firm could be run
most efficiently if a motivated outsider evaluated whether incumbent man-
agement is the right team to handle the firm’s problems or whether it needs
to be replaced. A powerful creditor could know what to do and have the
incentive to do it correctly, but if judicial doctrine is uncertain and danger-
ous for the creditor, with liability potentially substantial, then the creditor
could avoid intervention that could tag it with liability. It collects its loan as
best it can via the normal machinery of demanding repayment and suing the
debtor but does nothing more to influence the firm’s decisionmaking or the
identity of its decisionmakers. Yet, if the rules against creditor intervention
are too weak (e.g., if every creditor intervention colorably connected to the
creditor’s loan agreement were fair game for creditor action), then excessive
creditor intervention of the wrong kind could induce inefficient shutdowns
and excessive value shifts to the favored creditor. This risk might affect
others’ willingness to deal with the failing firm out of fear that the control-
ling creditor will excessively shift the debtor’s value to itself.
A. The Doctrinal Contradiction: Creditor Control
Versus Contractual Self-Protection
To see how unedifying the doctrinal distinctions governing an activist
creditor are, in both providing useful guidance and addressing the opera-
tional difficulties of a distressed firm, consider three pairings of cases:
9. E.g., Am. Consol. Transp. Cos. v. RBS Citizens N.A. (In re Am. Consol. Transp. Cos.),
433 B.R. 242 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
10. On the costs of bankruptcy, see Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation
of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. Fin. 1067 (1984); Ben Branch, The Costs of Bankruptcy: A
Review, 11 Int’l Rev. Fin. Analysis 39 (2002); Arturo Bris et al., The Costs of Bankruptcy:
Chapter 7 Liquidation Versus Chapter 11 Reorganization, 61 J. Fin. 1253 (2006); Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. Fin. Econ.
285 (1990); and Lawrence Summers & David Cutler, Texaco and Pennzoil Both Lost Big, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 14, 1988, at F3.
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American Lumber11 and W.T. Grant;12 Clark Pipe & Supply I13 and Clark Pipe
& Supply II;14 and American Consolidated15 and Busy Bee.16
The first pairing, American Lumber and W.T. Grant, juxtaposes the
modern judicial classics here, with the two courts dealing with substantially
similar facts differently. In the first case, American Lumber, the court equita-
bly subordinated the offending creditor—sending it to the end of the credi-
tor queue, to be paid only if the debtor had value left when the bankruptcy
process came to it. In the second, W.T. Grant, the court extolled the virtue
of creditor self-protection via its loan agreement and protected the belea-
guered creditor. The second pairing is the extraordinary Clark Pipe & Supply
sequence, in which the Fifth Circuit examined the creditors’ actions one day
and concluded that the creditor had perniciously taken control, thereby jus-
tifying the creditor’s equitable subordination. And then, another day, the
same court—indeed, the same panel—examined those creditor actions
again but concluded the second time that the creditor had only acted to
protect itself on its contract, and as such was free from liability. The last
pairing, American Consolidated and Busy Bee, shows that these contradic-
tions—similar facts, different outcomes—continue today.
1. American Lumber Versus W.T. Grant
In American Lumber, a creditor controlled the finances and operations
of the debtor lumber company to the detriment of the firm’s unsecured
creditors.17 The district court found that the bank had undertaken
a course of liquidation that was designed solely to preempt from general
unsecured creditors any portion of the value of the inventory and equip-
ment of [American Lumber] and to thereby enhance the value of [the
bank’s] previously existing security interest in the accounts receivable and
contract rights of [the debtor].18
11. Bergquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Am. Lumber Co.), 5 B.R. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).
12. Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
13. E.g., Smith v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 870 F.2d
1022, 1030 (5th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Clark Pipe & Supply I], withdrawn on reh’g, Clark Pipe
& Supply II, 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
14. Clark Pipe & Supply II, 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
15. Am. Consol. Transp. Cos. v. RBS Citizens N.A. (In re Am. Consol. Transp. Cos.),
433 B.R. 242 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010).
16. Busy Bee, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 97 CV 5078, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 238 (Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 28, 2006), aff’d, 932 A.2d 248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
17. Bergquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Am. Lumber Co.), 5 B.R. 470, 474 (D. Minn.
1980). The bank’s control over the debtor’s affairs included taking possession of the debtor’s
plants, requiring approval for any payment to other creditors, reducing the salaries of the
principals, and hiring and firing of employees. Id. The bank also misrepresented the debtor’s
financial condition to potential suppliers. Id.
18. Id. at 477 (quoting Bergquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Am. Lumber Co.), 7 B.R. 519,
529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The bank therefore had breached its fiduciary duty to the other creditors,
and the court equitably subordinated the bank’s claims to the other credi-
tors’ claims.19 The decision became a disdained cause célèbre among large
institutional creditors and their legal counsel.20
A few years later, in W.T. Grant, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit confirmed a bankruptcy litigation settlement, notwithstanding the
urging of some bondholders that the court equitably subordinate the bank-
rupt firm’s major secured bank lenders.21 The plaintiff bondholders asserted
that a pool of banks manipulated the debtor by forcing it to enter into secur-
ity agreements favoring the banking pool and refusing to make further loans
to the debtor until it executed new security agreements that benefited the
banks.22 When Grant management sought to buy back the bonds at a low
price, in a perhaps misguided effort to clean up its balance sheet, the banks
prevented Grant from doing so.23
The court rejected the dissenting bondholders’ view, concluding that a
“creditor is under no fiduciary obligation to its debtor or to other creditors
of the debtor in the collection of its claim” . . . . [A creditor can] us[e] his
bargaining position, including his ability to refuse to make further loans
needed by the debtor, to improve the status of his existing claims.24
The court said that to establish creditor liability, it is not enough to show
that
the banks kept careful watch on what was going on at Grant . . . . [T]he
appellants must show not simply that the banks proffered advice to Grant
that was unpalatable to management, even advice gloved with an implicit
threat that, unless it were taken, further loans would not be forthcoming.
They must show at least that the banks acted solely for their own benefit
. . . and adversely to the interest of others.25
19. Id. at 478. In its defense, the bank “argue[d] that subordination will cause members
of the financial community to feel that they cannot give financial assistance to failing compa-
nies, but must instead foreclose on their security interests and collect debts swiftly, not leaving
any chance for survival, [but] the Court [was] singularly unimpressed.” Id.
20. See Helen Davis Chaitman, The Equitable Subordination of Bank Claims, 39 Bus.
Law. 1561, 1569–71 (1984) (the author, a lender liability litigator, criticized the decision, not-
ing that “[t]he lesson . . . [from] American Lumber is clear: when a bank exposes itself to a
finding that it improperly exercised control over a borrower corporation, it risks the subordi-
nation of its entire claim against the borrower”); Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The
Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. Law. 417,
436–41 (1985); Werner F. Ebke & James R. Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Con-
ceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J. 775, 794–95 (1986); Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subor-
dination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of “Control”, 65 Tex.
L. Rev. 801, 827–29 (1987).
21. Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 605.
24. Id. at 609–10 (quoting In re W.T. Grant Co., 4 B.R. 53, 75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
25. Id. at 610–11.
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One might be tempted to distinguish American Lumber from W.T.
Grant by viewing the former as the lender actively directing the debtor’s
liquidation and the latter as the banks just providing advice “gloved with an
implicit threat.”26 One reason why such a distinction is unsound is that ad-
vice gloved with an implicit threat can be used to control the debtor. Advice
from a creditor who can induce a bankruptcy or shut down the debtor is
more than gratuitous advice from a sympathetic bystander that the debtor
will feel free to ignore. Indeed, the giver of such advice, if it is a large credi-
tor with a loan agreement in default, can de facto control the creditor.
What then separates control from gratuitous advice if the debtor is in
default under a major loan from that creditor—a creditor that the debtor
cannot afford to offend? The distinction between advice and control be-
comes one of poise and manners—and the effectiveness of the creditor’s
lawyers in conveying the creditor’s threat and its consequences, but doing so
politely and without explicitly directing the debtor—just pointing out the
consequences of the debtor’s choice of actions.
A second reason why a simple direction–advice distinction is unsound is
that a creditor could induce a controlled liquidation of the corporation
without assuming an actively and explicitly controlling position. The next
pairing of cases demonstrates this possibility.
2. Clark Pipe & Supply I Versus Clark Pipe & Supply II
Clark Pipe and Supply Company, Inc. was in the business of buying and
selling oil pipe.27 When its business deteriorated, its main creditor, a finance
company, reduced its advances to Clark, leaving the debtor with just enough
money to “keep its doors open and to sell the inventory.”28 The finance
company knew that the debtor’s bankruptcy was inevitable and used the
advances “to leverage its recovery at the expense of other creditors.”29 It
improved its recovery, and it did so at the expense of the other creditors
because “[e]very time Clark sold pipe,” the finance company obtained the
resulting account receivable as security, which “improved its position to the
detriment of the vendor.”30 In the debtor–creditor vernacular, the dominat-
ing creditor used its influence to induce the debtor to feed the lien, moving
value from where it lacked a security interest into assets that the creditor
could seize as security, thereby getting more value out of the enterprise, at
the expense of the firm’s unsecured creditors.
26. Id. at 610.
27. Clark Pipe & Supply I, 870 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1989), withdrawn on reh’g,
Clark Pipe & Supply II, 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1029.
30. Id. at 1030.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held for the other creditors,
concluding that “Clark was an instrumentality of [the creditor] for the lim-
ited purpose of equitable subordination.”31 The court viewed the creditor as
controlling the debtor and running the debtor for its own benefit.
But shortly thereafter came an extraordinary judicial reversal. The court
treated a suggestion for rehearing en banc from the losing party as a petition
for a panel rehearing of the case.32 The same panel then reheard the case and
reversed itself.33 The panel, which had condemned the creditor’s control the
first time it examined its conduct, took a contractarian approach and exon-
erated it: “Through its loan agreement, every lender effectively exercises
‘control’ over its borrower to some degree.”34 Control is not the touchstone
for liability, it said.35 The creditor could protect its rights under the contract,
even by facilitating a slow liquidation of the debtor.36 The creditor “was not
a fiduciary of Clark, it did not exert improper control over Clark’s financial
affairs, and it did not act inequitably in exercising its rights under its loan
agreement with Clark.”37
In such a doctrinal setting, where the same appellate panel views the
facts one day as supporting creditor liability and views those same facts an-
other day as just a creditor enforcing its contract, it becomes hard for credi-
tors to know when they are crossing, or even approaching, a liability line.
3. Busy Bee Versus American Consolidated
Lest the reader conclude that these two pairings were decades-old doc-
trinal mishaps that have since been resolved, consider the recent Busy Bee
and American Consolidated decisions. In Busy Bee, a Pennsylvania court in
2006 examined a lender’s influence over a borrower.38 The court said that a
“confidential or fiduciary relationship” arose “if the lender gains substantial
control over the borrower’s business affairs by compelling the borrower to
engage in unusual transactions or by becoming involved in the actual day-
to-day operations of the borrower.”39 Indeed, the offended parties showed
that “the Bank compelled [the debtor] to . . . abandon[ ] . . . its retail con-
version strategy and . . . liquidat[e] . . . its retail business. The Bank also
31. Id.
32. Clark Pipe & Supply II, 893 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1990).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 701.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 702.
37. Id. While the surface interpretation is that the judges looked at the same evidence
and changed their minds, the possibility of a rehearing en banc, perhaps with in-chambers
indications of judicial disagreement, could have induced the judges to reexamine their earlier
thinking.
38. Busy Bee, Inc. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., No. 97 CV 5078, 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec.
LEXIS 238 (Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 28, 2006), aff’d, 932 A.2d 248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
39. Id. at *68.
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became involved with [the debtor’s] day-to-day operations by, inter alia, di-
recting [the debtor] to retain . . . [a particular] liquidation consultant.”40
Hence, “the Bank assumed a fiduciary responsibility.”41
Soon thereafter, an Illinois court faced similar facts but used a con-
tractarian analysis to conclude that pernicious “control is not established
when a lender insists on standard loan agreement restrictions, closely
monitors the borrower’s finances, and makes business recommendations,
even [in] the context of heated negotiations. Nor is [liability-inducing] con-
trol established when a borrower hires a management or restructuring con-
sultant selected by the lender.”42 The creditor may well have controlled the
debtor because managers felt compelled to follow the creditor’s goals, but
since the creditor exercised that influence and control through its loan con-
tract, that control was not sufficiently pernicious to lead to liability.43 Man-
agement could in principle have rejected the insistent creditor’s efforts but
then would have faced the creditor’s rights under the loan agreement.44 Al-
though the debtor complained that “the Bank forced it to enter into [new
loan terms] after the Bank declared [the debtor] in default,” and although
the Bank forced it “to take steps towards selling the business . . . even though
[the debtor] wanted to remain in business[,] . . . none of these actions
usurped managerial control from the [debtor’s] directors and officers.”45
Thus, here are the bottom line contrasts: in both Busy Bee and American
Consolidated, the lenders (1) required the debtor to hire the creditor’s pre-
ferred restructuring consultant and (2) forced the liquidation of a major
part of the debtor’s business over the debtor’s objections. These were the
core facts on controlling-creditor liability in both cases, but the Busy Bee
court held the creditor liable and the American Consolidated court did not.46
4. Objective Facts Versus Eye-of-the-Beholder Viewpoint
The current doctrines put a premium on creditors’ being well be-
haved—that is, on their conforming to shared norms of permissible creditor
action, particularly if the deciding court shares those commercial norms.
Contrast creditor demeanor in two settings. In the first, the creditor, facing a
debtor in default under the loan agreement, demands that the debtor take
specified actions. It might demand that the debtor close down a weak fac-
tory. It might demand that the board change senior management and hire
the creditor’s preferred turnaround firm. Perhaps in negotiations the
40. Id. at *66–67.
41. Id. at *68.
42. Am. Consol. Transp. Cos. v. RBS Citizens N.A. (In re Am. Consol. Transp. Cos.),




46. Busy Bee also involved creditor fraud, which perhaps influenced the court when
making its overall decision, but that fraud was not part of its creditor-in-control liability ratio-
nale. See Busy Bee, Inc., 2006 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 238.
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workout lawyer for the aggressive creditor slams a fist into the conference
room table, telling the debtor’s managers that they are working for the cred-
itor now, and they had better do what the creditor thinks makes business
sense. This creditor is at risk of being seen as taking control of the debtor,
managing it, and assuming fiduciary duties to the debtor’s other creditors or
to the debtor itself.
In the second setting, the creditor, faced with a similar debtor default,
makes no demands. Instead, it offers the debtor some observations. It tells
the debtor, “You’re in default under the loan agreement. We haven’t decided
yet whether to accelerate and demand repayment in full, which would
thereby most likely induce you to file for bankruptcy. But we will tell you
that we’d feel a lot better if you closed the weak factory. And, we’ve been in
workout situations before. We feel very comfortable working with the people
at Turnaround Team X and Consulting Firm Y. We’re not telling you what
to do. We’re not telling you that you must close down that money-losing
factory. We’re not even telling you with certainty what we will do under the
loan agreement because we haven’t decided. But we do want you to know
that you have some options here, as there are operational decisions that
might salvage a good part of the firm’s operations and there are profession-
als with whom we’d go the extra mile to avoid a bankruptcy.”
One set of courts is more likely to interpret the second scenario as not
entailing pernicious control but as simple advice. Those courts might well
understand that the superficially arm’s-length advice comes via a velvet
glove wrapped around the loan agreement fist, as the W.T. Grant court sug-
gested.47 But they could see this advice as appropriate input from an inter-
ested creditor, one who might offer the advice while reminding the debtor
that it is in default under the contract. Such courts could see that advice as
not entailing the wrongful, pernicious control that would expose the lender
to liability.
But where does the creditor’s power come from to have its advice be
taken seriously by the debtor? It does not come from an inherent capacity to
control and direct the enterprise—the creditor does not own and vote the
company’s stock. The doctrinal difficulty is that the creditor’s power to have
its advice taken or to dictate debtor actions comes from its loan agreement
and the remedies it would have if the debtor defaulted under the loan con-
tract. A polite creditor has enormous leverage over its debtor, making the
debtor listen attentively to the creditor’s suggestions and, quite likely when
the debtor is in default, follow them. It can make an offer or give advice that
the debtor will not refuse. And, symmetrically, the debtor can tell the impo-
lite, tougher, bullying creditor that seeks control of the debtor’s operations
that its demands will not be followed; the debtor can also tell the polite
creditor that its suggestions will not be followed. In either instance, the cred-
itor’s remedy is to turn to its loan agreement.
47. See Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2d Cir. 1983).
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Directive language, an ordering tone, and a relationship that seems con-
trolling are all associated with creditor liability.48 In contrast, creditor advice,
creditor contract enforcement, and conditional loan waivers in another line
of decisions are in contrast associated with creditors not being liable.49 These
tonal distinctions make a difference to courts but should be less important
than they have been.
Creditor power comes from the creditor’s loan agreement. A creditor
can induce a debtor to favor itself over the firm’s other creditors if they lack
the loan agreement advantages of the dominating creditor, and it can do so
without formal control. The question is not whether the creditor’s actions
constituted control that was continuous and deep, as opposed to being inter-
stitial and merely advisory, without insisted-on demands. As Douglas Baird
and Robert Rasmussen state, the doctrines in this area are “unsettled enough
to cause lenders (or at least their counsel) to make their intentions known
without issuing stark commands.”50
48. For additional decisions equating the creditor action with pernicious control that
produced fiduciary duties or creditor action that the court saw to be a basic breach of good
faith and, in the end, liability, see Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp. 828 F.2d 686,
691–92 (11th Cir. 1987); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985);
Melamed v. Lake Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 727 F.2d 1399, 1403–04 (6th Cir. 1984); Limor v. Buerger
(In re Del-Met Corp.), 322 B.R. 781, 811 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2005); Official Comm. of Un-
secured Creditors v. Credit Suisse First Boston (In re Exide Techs., Inc.), 299 B.R. 732, 743
(Bankr. D. Del. 2003); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Debtors v. Austin Fin.
Servs., Inc. (In re KDI Holdings, Inc.), 277 B.R. 493, 512–13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re
Beverages Int’l Ltd., 50 B.R. 273, 283 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of Am.,
701 P.2d 826, 837–38 (Cal. 1985); and A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d
285, 291 (Minn. 1981).
49. For additional decisions viewing the creditor’s action as no more than an effort to
enforce its loan agreement, and, hence, as creating neither fiduciary duties nor liability, see
Famm Steel, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 93, 102–03 (1st Cir. 2009); Krivo Indus. Supply
Co. v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1110 (5th Cir. 1973); Schwan’s Sales
Enters., Inc. v. Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (D. Mass. 2005); Nat’l
Westminster Bank USA v. Century Healthcare Corp., 885 F. Supp. 601, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Dixon v. Am. Cmty. Bank & Trust (In re Gluth Bros. Constr., Inc.), 424 B.R. 379, 390 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2009); Nisselson v. Softbank AM Corp. (In re MarketXT Holdings Corp.), 361 B.R.
369, 391 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Matrix IV, Inc. (In re S.M.
Acquisitions Co.), 332 B.R. 346, 352 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 05
C 7076, 2006 WL 2290990 (N.D. Ill. 2006); and Spillers v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 335 So. 2d
851, 852–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
50. Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of
Corporate Governance, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209, 1235–36 (2006); see also 2 Weil, Gotshal &
Manges LLP, Reorganizing Failing Business: A Comprehensive Review and Analysis
of Financial Restructuring and Business Reorganization 18-64, 18-65 (rev. ed. 2006)
(“Of late, particularly in the areas of equitable subordination and nonstatutory lender liability
based on conduct, the pendulum has swung in favor of lenders, particularly at the appellate
level. Nonetheless, lenders should be aware that the more control they have and exert over
their borrowers, the more likely it is that they will be held liable under any number of
theories.”).
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B. The Conflicts in Play
Three major conflicts can be culled from the case law: a vertical conflict
in which the targeted creditor could induce the firm to move value from one
level of the debtor’s capital structure to another level where the creditor can
claim priority over other creditors (as in American Lumber and the Clark
Pipe & Supply cases); a horizontal conflict in which the creditor gets paid
while other creditors at the same level do not; and another vertical conflict
(as in Busy Bee and American Consolidated) in which the creditor manages
the firm to provide more value to its layer in the capital structure. These
conflicts, illustrated in the balance sheets below, recur in insolvent firms.
First, the controlling creditor that goes beyond collecting its loan can
induce the firm to manage itself such that more value appears in the credi-
tor’s capital layer.
Figure 1. Lien Feeding: Vertical Distortion
Time (1) 
Assets Liabilities 
$1,000 inventory $1,000 trade debt 
$   500 accounts receivable $1,000 syndicated bank loan 
             [The bank loan is secured by the 
            accounts receivable, but the 
            receivables are insufficient to 
            cover the loan.]  
Time (2) 
Assets Liabilities 
$   500 inventory $1,000 trade debt 
$1,000 accounts receivable $1,000 syndicated bank loan 
             [The bank loan is now fully 
            secured.]  
Figure 1 illustrates lien feeding. The dominant creditor finds itself undersecured. It induces the debtor to sell 
inventory, which, when sold, becomes an accounts receivable covered by the lender’s security agreement. In 
the balance sheets above, the firm loses no value due to the creditor’s influence, but its value is redistributed in 
the dominant creditor’s favor. Lien feeding is particularly pernicious socially if the creditor induces the debtor to 
sell the $500 of inventory, but the debtor cannot generate the full $500 in additional receivables from the sale. 
The dominant creditor is better off, but the total value of the firm’s operations has diminished. 
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Second, the controlling creditor can induce the firm to pay the control-
ling creditor back before paying any of the other creditors:
Figure 2. Preferential Repayment: Horizontal Distortion
Time (1) 
Assets Liabilities 
$1,000 cash $1,000 syndicated bank loan  
$   500 machinery $1,000 trade debt 
Time (2) 
Firm pays all its value to the bank syndicate, leaving nothing for trade creditors. 
Assets Liabilities 
$   500 machinery $1,000 trade debt 
The scenarios in Figures 1 and 2 are related because moving firm value
into security—as in the first scenario in Figure 1—is a type of partial repay-
ment, while the second scenario—illustrated in Figure 2—is a full
repayment.
Third, the controlling creditor can mismanage the firm, such that the
firm is more likely to produce value that will pay the creditor back at the
expense of other capital-providers, such as stockholders. So, if the firm has
an expected value of $2,500, from equal chances of being worth $0 or
$5,000, the controlling creditor could prefer a lower-value business strategy
that produces only $2,000 but does so assuredly. As Figure 3 illustrates, this
possibility is captured in the potential for creditors to liquidate firms too
quickly. It is also in play in the creditor-versus-stockholder conflict at the
root of State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,51 dis-
cussed below.
On these numbers, illustrated in Figure 3, creditor control of this debtor
is pernicious. But it would not take much imagination to change the num-
bers so that the liquidation strategy would be the best for the firm overall (if
the market for its products has deteriorated and the firm was no longer a
viable business with any continuing going concern value). If a court could
readily review and judge the business decisions, then it could itself directly
manage the creditor-liability decision, making the creditor liable for induc-
ing a self-interested liquidation but not for inducing a value-maximizing
liquidation. If a court cannot review the substance of a business decision
accurately, then it needs a different set of tools to manage such a conflict. In
the corporate boardroom context, courts generally see themselves as poorly
suited for such business review, which they undertake only as a last resort.
51. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, Mar. 6, 1985.
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$2,500 [from (.5 • 0) + (.5 • $5,000)] $2,000 banks and other debt 
$   500 stockholders 
At time (1), the banks are at risk because the firm has a 50 percent chance of being unable to pay the banks 
back. The stockholders have some value in the firm from the 50 percent chance that the firm value will exceed 
$2,000. 
Time (2) 
Bank induces firm to liquidate its factories for $2000. 
Assets Liabilities 
$2,000 cash $2,000 banks and other debt 
$       0 stockholders 
At time (2), the banks are no longer at risk because the firm’s value is fixed at $2,000, the exact amount that the 
firm owes to the banks. The stockholders no longer have any value in the firm and the firm is worth only $2,000, 
while at time (1) it had a value of $2,500. Because the banks are paid in full if the firm is liquidated but risk not 
being paid if it is continued, the banks’ incentive from the capital structure is to induce the firm to liquidate, even 
though continuance yields a higher-value firm. 
C. The Operational Problems: The Importance of Getting the
Judicial Standard Right
1. Operational Costs of Deterring Capable Creditors from
Intervening in Failing Firms
More than doctrinal niceties are at stake. In a dynamic economy, firms
rise, fall, and fail. Of those that fail, some could be turned around and rise
again. For others that would fail regardless, effective management could
dampen the costs of failure. Reducing the costs and frequency of failure
could make capital for risky firms less expensive and mute the social costs of
jobs lost as firms fail. We should want a doctrinal overlay that encourages
constructive creditor engagement with the distressed firm.
Firm failure is often management failure.52 Incumbent management
might have mistakenly run the company into the ground. Sometimes in-
cumbent management is just unlucky, finding itself running a firm in an
industry with declining demand or rising costs, but it is not the manage-
ment team best positioned to turn the company around. Yet managerial self-
52. Cf. Edward I. Altman & Edith Hotchkiss, Corporate Financial Distress and
Bankruptcy 221–23 (3d ed. 2006); David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes
Following Top Management Dismissals, 50 J. Fin. 1029, 1055 (1995) (“[F]orced top manage-
ment changes are preceded by large and significant operating performance declines and fol-
lowed by significant improvements in operating performance.”); Mark R. Huson et al.,
Managerial Succession and Firm Performance, 74 J. Fin. Econ. 237, 273 (2004) (“[M]anagerial
quality and expected firm operating performance increase after CEO turnover.”).
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interest could lead managers who are no longer right for the firm to keep
themselves in place for too long, with replacement only coming in the firm’s
bankruptcy, if at all.
Operational costs can thus be visited on the firm if legal doctrine exces-
sively deters creditor entry into influencing the failed firm. Too strict a rule
of creditor conduct could induce competent creditors to remain passive, for
fear of doctrinal uncertainty and later liability. Yet, a creditor, when manag-
ing its loan to a debtor, could have acquired enough knowledge of the
debtor and its operational reverses for the creditor to become a good de
facto board. The creditor could contribute to managing the firm, may be
well positioned to judge whether the business problems were due to bad luck
or bad management, and may be able to make an informed judgment as to
whether to replace or keep current management. Furthermore, the creditor’s
active encouragement of the debtor’s turnaround may reassure the market
about the firm’s prospects: the market might see a knowledgeable insider
with skin in the game as someone who thinks that the firm is viable. But if
judicial doctrine punishes it severely and unpredictably for managerial in-
volvement, the creditor will stay away more than we should want it to.53
Randall Kroszner and Philip Strahan investigated American banker
board behavior and found it to be consistent with the logic of the negative
incentives emanating from these doctrinal uncertainties.54 They found that
one-third of the Forbes 500 firms had a banker on the board.55 However,
American bankers tended to be less active than bankers in other nations,
and, in other nations without the American creditor-liability doctrines that
motivate this Article’s inquiry, banker board representation was denser than
here.56 But Kroszner and Strahan’s most telling findings were that American
bankers sought stable firms and avoided boards of firms facing financial
distress, in contrast to the opposite practice common in other nations.57 Yet
those distressed firms are the ones most likely to need help.58
53. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 505, 538–40 (1977) (“[A] preventive rule that insiders’ debt claims are subordi-
nated automatically to those of outsiders may be objectionable because it appears unjust as
applied to those insiders who do in fact deal honestly, fairly, and nonpreferentially with their
corporations. Indeed, there are compelling arguments which suggest that insiders be allowed
to participate in their corporations as creditors on the same basis as outsiders.”).
54. Randall S. Kroszner & Phillip E. Strahan, Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of
Interest, and Lender Liability, 62 J. Fin. Econ. 415, 422 (2001).
55. Id. at 416–17.
56. See id. at 416.
57. See id. at 445–47.
58. See id. at 422; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Corporate Law 46 (1991).
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2. Operational Costs to Allowing Excessive Creditor Distortions in
Managing Failed Firms
The converse of the above is true as well. If the rule overly facilitates
creditor entry into its debtor’s decisionmaking apparatus, then a firm could
be needlessly mismanaged. A creditor of an operationally salvageable firm
could take control, force the firm’s liquidation, and destroy social and eco-
nomic value—but still profit from that destruction. If the rules facilitate
creditor action to foster a check on firm management, those same rules and
standards could also thereby facilitate the negatives of hasty creditor-in-
duced liquidations and shifts in value to the controlling creditor. Preference
and fraudulent conveyance law control some such transfers,59 with equitable
subordination often thought to round out the setting.60 But if courts exces-
sively defer to the creditor and inappropriately fail to invoke equitable sub-
ordination, then the sharp-eyed creditor could steal the firm.
Kenneth Ayotte and Edward Morrison examined another sample of
public and private Chapter 11 filings and found that secured creditors liqui-
date more quickly when they have adequate security for themselves than
when they do not.61 And three economists, after reviewing their own data,
recently concluded that misplaced strengthened creditor rights do, in fact,
distort business decisions: “[S]tronger creditor rights induce risk-reducing
investments. Strong creditor rights in default may lead to inefficient liquida-
tion, which extinguishes the continuation option of a firm’s enterprise and
thus hurts shareholder value.”62
Moreover, the density and frequency of these conflicts and operational
difficulties are not minor. In one study, finance researchers examined 7,600
debtor defaults during the past decade and found that creditors obtained
benefits not contemplated by their contracts.63 Creditors used the debtors’
loan agreement “violations to apply noncontractual control over the govern-
ance of [the debtor] firms,” resulting in “a statistically and economically
significant increase in CEO [replacement].”64 As Baird and Rasmussen note,
59. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547–48, 550 (2006).
60. See id. § 510(c).
61. Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter
11, 1 J. Legal Anal. 511, 528–30 (2009).
62. Viral V. Acharya et al., Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-Taking, 102 J. Fin. Econ.
150, 151–52 (2011); see also Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corpo-
rate Duty to Creditors, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1321, 1353–54 (2007).
63. Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Govern-
ance, and Firm Value, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1713 (2012).
64. Id. at 1716. An interpretive ambiguity might be in play: even if creditor rights to
control CEO turnover were not explicitly stated in the contracts that Nini, Smith, and Sufi
examined, creditors might readily see them as a consequence of any forbearance on collecting
the loan. See Sadi Ozelge & Anthony Saunders, The Role of Lending Banks in Forced CEO
Turnovers, 44 J. Money Credit & Banking 631 (2012); Yili Lian, Creditor Control Rights,
Corporate Governance and Bond Performance: Evidence from Loan Covenant Violation (July 9,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2135083.
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in distressed situations it is not unusual for creditors to condition their con-
tinuing to finance the enterprise on the debtor appointing a chief restructur-
ing officer to the creditor’s liking.65 In these situations, the chief
restructuring officer “may be compensated by the company, but her interests
are aligned with the lenders.”66
Finally, with the growing number of hedge fund and private equity po-
sitions in financially troubled companies, the potential increases for either
distortive management by conflicted financial institutions or improved
management by new interventions.67 Getting this trade-off right has always
been important—and is now more important than ever—with increased ec-
onomic volatility inducing more business and with powerful new institu-
tional players active in restructurings.
II. The Corporate Law Analogue
Business law faces similar trade-offs in an equally critical setting: the
board of directors’ liability for mistaken business decisions. Just like the con-
trolling creditor facing liability, the board controls the firm and could be
made liable for mistakes and self-interested decisions. In the board’s case,
the liability runs from the board to the firm or its shareholders; likewise, in
the creditor’s case, liability runs from the controlling creditor to the firm or
its other creditors. We will get considerable purchase on the creditor-in-
control problem by examining the analogous corporate doctrines, seeing
how controlling creditors would fare under these doctrines, and then exam-
ining the reasons why these corporate doctrines are not invoked in creditor
situations.
65. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 50, at 1233.
66. Id. at 1234; see also Nini et al., supra note 63, at 1715 (explaining how creditors use
loan covenant defaults to force managerial change). The bankrupt’s primary lender (the so-
called “DIP lender”) often has power analogous to that of the controlling creditor outside of
bankruptcy. As Baird and Rasmussen show,
[S]ecured creditors have learned, largely through terms contained in debtor-in-posses-
sion (DIP) financing, how to gain control over the debtor during the bankruptcy itself.
The increase in control rights, combined with the heterogeneity in the most senior
tranche, increases the risk that creditors pursuing their own individual agendas will not
advance the interests of creditors as a group.
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 Yale L.J. 648, 676 (2010)
(footnote omitted).
67. See Circuit City Unplugged: Why Did Chapter 11 Fail to Save 34,000 Jobs?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 22 (2009) (statement of Harvey R. Miller, senior partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP)
(“Distressed debt traders and hedge funds have different objectives than those of vendor/sup-
pliers. They are motivated by quick and sizeable returns on their investment. Because their
entry price usually is much lower than the face amount of the acquired debt, they are more apt
to favor the sale and dismemberment of a debtor, if it will yield faster and greater recoveries
based upon the costs of purchasing claims.”); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281, 282 (2009).
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A. Corporate Law Basics
A board of directors decides whether to liquidate the firm’s factories or
keep the firm’s business going. It decides whether to keep or replace senior
management. It decides whether to second-guess incumbent management
by getting a consulting firm’s advice. These are basic decisions that boards
commonly make as firms fail.
Yet in the corporate boardroom context, decisions to close factories or
change management do not take on the same controversial character that
they do in the failing-firm, creditor-in-control context. The corporate rules
reduce controversy in the decisionmaking and reduce judicial second-guess-
ing of the board’s decisions. Judicial rules evaluating board decisions are
more functional and serve as better guides for business behavior than the
judicial rules evaluating creditor conduct.
Board-based corporate decisions lack the creditor-based controversy,
because corporate decisions are typically shielded by the business-judgment
rule: if the board is not conflicted, then the court will defer to the board’s
business judgment. “The business judgment rule [is a standard of judicial
review that] presumes that in making a business decision, independent and
disinterested directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
corporation.”68
But if the board is conflicted, then the court will indeed second-guess
the board with an entire fairness review. As three of the country’s leading
business judges stated, if the plaintiff shows that the directors have an inter-
est in the transaction, the burden to prove that the transaction was “entirely
fair” to the corporation switches over to the defendants. “[T]he basic ratio-
nale for entire fairness review [is] the difficulty in ascertaining, in non-
arm’s-length transactions, the price at which the deal would have been ef-
fected in the market.”69 The court may conclude that the conflicted board
approved a transaction that was fair to the corporation and thus absolve that
board of liability. As the Delaware chancery court has said, however, “[T]he
determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is
determinative of the outcome.”70 Indeed, anticipating entire fairness review
for conflicted decisions, boards and their legal counsel can often manufac-
ture business-judgment deference even with a conflicted board, by taking
the decisionmaking away from the conflicted directors and placing it before
a board committee of unconflicted directors.
68. American Bar Association, Corporate Director’s Guidebook 27 (6th ed.
2011).
69. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its
Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 449, 461 (2002).
70. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.), 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del.
1995) (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. The Creditor Takes Control: Entire Fairness Review for Conflicted
Creditor Transactions
The typical creditor-in-control setting helps explain why this corporate
law analogy has not, as far as we know, been previously made. The control-
ling creditor is always making self-interested decisions. It wants the firm to
take low-risk, liquidation-oriented decisions to collapse the firm’s future in-
come distribution so that the firm can pay off the controlling creditor as
much as possible. The creditor does not want just any new management
team in place but wants one that will produce cash quickly to pay the credi-
tor, even if it comes at the expense of firm value and reduces payments to
other creditors. The controlling creditors’ conflicts are so obvious that there
seems to have been no reason to consider business-judgment deference.
Courts quite properly jump to the creditor-type version of full, entire fair-
ness review.
C. The Creditor Takes Control: Business-Judgment Deference for
Nonconflicted Transactions
But what if the controlling creditor lacked major financial conflicts of
interest? Yes, it is hard to imagine at first that the conflicts could be only
minor, but consider the abstract possibility. In a low-conflict setting, the
court could be satisfied that the creditor was likely to be making judgments
that would maximize total firm value. If this were the case, the court would
have little reason to second-guess the creditor’s decisions, or at least have no
more reason to second-guess the creditor than the court has to second-guess
an unconflicted board. Boards and creditors make business mistakes—by
taking calculated risks that do not pay off, for example. But when they lack
gross conflicts, courts could think that the judiciary is unlikely to systemati-
cally do better than the business players. Those business players are the
boards directing firms in one setting and the firm’s major creditors influenc-
ing the debtor firms in another.
Indeed, in similar corporate circumstances, the Delaware courts protect
corporate decisionmakers. When the firm is nearly insolvent, courts in re-
cent years have considered the possibility that the board, presumably the
nonconflicted board, can make decisions that favor the firm as a whole,
without considering only the interests of the shareholders.71 As one Dela-
ware court emphasized, such decisions will be accorded business-judgment
deference: “[D]irectors would be protected by the business judgment rule if
they, in good faith, pursued a less risky business strategy precisely because
they feared that a more risky strategy might render the firm unable to meet
71. See Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004);
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo,
What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992–2004? A Retrospective
on Some Key Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1399, 1430 (2005). But cf. N. Am. Catholic
Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del. 2007).
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its legal obligations to creditors and other constituencies.”72 Could that ana-
logue of an unconflicted board be constructed for the creditor of the failing
firm?
D. Considering a Contractual Trump to Corporate Law Doctrine
Contractual qualifications to the foregoing analysis, along with a closer
look at several additional contractarian considerations, are now necessary.
Does the loan contract’s terms determine the range of judicial action as to
the controlling creditor?
[T]he efficient ex ante bargain may include terms that look inefficient ex
post. . . . [C]reditors may need to . . . have the ability to engage in self-
serving behavior that compromises the value of the business as a whole in
order to ensure that the shareholders have the right set of incentives in the
previous period.73
But one can take a strong contractarian stance,74 an approach to which the
authors here generally subscribe, and still recognize the great need for a new
approach to creditor duties.
First, contractarian characteristics underlie even aggressive judicial im-
plication of fiduciary duties. Courts that impose duties on controlling credi-
tors still do not deny creditors their contract right to sue and collect on their
loan. They rather evaluate a creditor’s behavior that is not basic collection
activity. The fiduciary-duty courts, however, do not conclude that con-
tractarian deference to straight collection action should extend to when the
creditor uses its loan to leverage influence on the firm. That added action, a
fiduciary-oriented court could conclude, is not part of the contract.75 But a
72. Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004).
73. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s Money, 60 Stan. L. Rev.
1309, 1314 (2008) (footnote omitted); see also Frederick Tung, Gap Filling in the Zone of Insol-
vency, 1 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 607, 618–19 (2007) (“The possibility of draconian remedies upon
default reduces adverse selection ex ante and may induce good behavior on the borrower’s part
ex post. Because the borrower has private information about the condition of the business, it is
important that upon default, the lender have significant bargaining power in order to be able
to extract as much value as possible in a workout. The lender’s ability to shut down the busi-
ness provides such leverage. This arrangement inures to borrowers’ benefit as well. In the
competitive lending markets in which banks operate, reducing banks’ losses translates into
lower borrowing costs for firms.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor,
Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967, 983 (2006) (ex-
plaining how venture capital startups’ capital structures can be part of an efficient ex ante
bargain but lead to ex post inefficiencies).
74. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of Lender Liability, 99 Yale L.J. 131, 140–42,
147 (1989) (“Optimal fiduciary rules approximate the bargain that the parties would have
reached if the costs of contracting were zero.”); Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract:
Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 Emory L.J. 809, 817, 856–57 (2008) (“Pri-
vate contracting alone should be effective to shift managers’ loyalties in favor of creditors.
Additional legal constraints are both unnecessary and costly.”).
75. E.g., State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 686 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984), appeal dismissed per stipulation, Mar. 6, 1985 (stating that “it was the legitimate
option of the lenders to determine whether or not [the appointment of a particular CEO]
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full-throated contractarian still might protect the added action (of condi-
tioning waiver on debtor action not explicitly covered by the loan agree-
ment), seeing a creditor’s waiver on condition that the debtor take this or
that action as a lesser included offense to suing and collecting. But critics of
this approach could see the creditor’s and debtor’s actions as not fully wor-
thy of the same contractarian deference that they would give to straight col-
lection activity, if that conditional waiver transferred value from other
creditors to the activist creditor. If the debtor and dominant creditor manip-
ulate the firm or its finances in ways that deeply affect third parties—namely
the firm’s other creditors—contractarian deference may well not be
warranted.
A second, related consideration is obvious: contracts are often incom-
plete. Even heavily negotiated loan agreements have open-ended terms or
fail to anticipate the consequences of the full range of operational outcomes
over the life of the loan. The loan may have a financial covenant that has
been violated, and the available remedies may not explicitly include the right
to name new management or direct the firm’s operations.76 Indeed, strong
contractarians recognize this possibility when they propose “to interpret the
duty of good faith as equivalent to a prohibition of opportunistic behavior.
Under this view, lenders are entitled to the benefit of their bargain but are
precluded from using contractual terms as a pretense for extracting benefits
for which they have not bargained.”77
Thus, even courts holding the strongest contractarian view of
debtor–creditor relations will need to assess the extent to which the control-
ling creditor’s behavior was opportunistic and went beyond what the con-
tract terms permitted. If the contract was clear or if the creditor just did not
negotiate for formal rights to control future firm investments in the event of
the debtor’s default, the case for implying fiduciary duties is not a strong
one in our usual business jurisprudence, and recent erosions, analysts argue,
should be cut back.78
But consider the possibility that the loan agreement is specific and ex-
plicit: “In the event of a default, the creditor may liquidate the firm immedi-
ately in a value-destroying fire sale.” Or, “in the event of a default, the
should be viewed as a default,” but it was not fair game “to issue warnings designed to force
the board to elect someone other than” that person).
76. See generally Tung, supra note 73, at 617–18.
77. Fischel, supra note 74, at 141 (footnote omitted); see also Kham & Nate’s Shoes No.
2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (“ ‘Good faith’ is . . . an
implied undertaking not to take opportunistic advantage in a way that could not have been
contemplated at the time of drafting, and which therefore was not resolved explicitly by the
parties. When the contract is silent, principles of good faith—such as the UCC’s standard of
honesty in fact, UCC § 1-201(19), and the reasonable expectations of the trade, UCC § 2-
103(b) . . . fill the gap. They do not block use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”).
Again, even in a contractarian framework, we need to assess whether creditor action is prima-
rily opportunistic or contract-based.
78. Tung, supra note 74, at 815–16.
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creditor may name new management, in its sole discretion, to run the com-
pany in the creditor’s interest.” As between that creditor and the debtor, the
contractarian view would be that the creditor can engage in even value-
destroying creditor actions. (A contractarian, aiming also to maximize social
wealth ex post, might hope that merger markets are strong enough that the
creditor or the stockholder can sell the firm for a higher value to capture
what would be lost in any creditor mismanagement or fire sale, but that is
another matter. A contractarian might also hope that, in the face of such a
contract, the stockholders and creditors would negotiate a Coasian deal79 to
deploy the firm most efficiently. The doctrinal and business structures we
propose in the next Parts are designed in part to facilitate such a Coasian
efficient deployment of the distressed firm, even in the face of an ex ante
value-destroying contract.)
The difficulty of the full contractarian view even here, in an unusual
setting of contractual explicitness on control, is not that it would permit the
creditor to liquidate or name new management, against the debtor’s objec-
tions, but that the creditor could be enabled to do so in the face of objections
from the firm’s other creditors. True, if other financial creditors lent to the
debtor after examining the loan agreement with the control-and-liquidate
covenants—that is, if they were themselves fully contracting creditors, with
knowledge of the prior deals—then the contractarian view would bind those
informed, subsequent creditors. But vis-à-vis a wide range of other credi-
tors—many preexisting creditors and most tax claimants, as well as many
trade creditors, tort claimants, and consumer creditors—the explicit con-
tractarian framework fits poorly. These creditors in the aggregate can be
substantial for a firm. Think of many small tort claimants in the mass tort
cases that drove firm after firm that dealt with asbestos into bankruptcy.
Think of tax, consumer, and supplier claims on typical businesses. Such
claims have figured prominently in major cases, such as American Lumber,80
Clark Pipe & Supply II,81 and W.T. Grant.82
In these three settings, pure deference to an incomplete contract, or to
waivers of defaults in exchange for operational concessions, would work er-
ratically in maximizing value. Too many creditors are not party to the rele-
vant contract.
79. The Coase Theorem indicates that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will
bargain to efficiently use their resources, regardless of which party is liable to the other. R. H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960).
80. Bergquist v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Am. Lumber Co.), 5 B.R. 470, 475 (D. Minn.
1980).
81. Clark Pipe & Supply II, 893 F.2d 693, 695–96 (5th Cir. 1990).
82. Cosoff v. Rodman (In re W.T. Grant Co.), 699 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1983). This
multilateral bargain seems implicit in Jonathan Lipson’s review of the creditor duty problem,
when he suggests that the duty of good faith in such contractual relationships should require
that powerful creditors dealing with distressed firms consider the interests of all parties that
the workout affects. Jonathan C. Lipson, Governance in the Breach: Controlling Creditor Oppor-
tunism, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1035, 1073 (2011).
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In principle, these contractarian issues could arise elsewhere in the life
cycle of the firm—contracts are always incomplete, some creditors do not
fully negotiate contracts, bilateral contracts have third-party effects on other
creditors. But these difficulties are more acute when the firm is insolvent or
nearly so.
Regardless, for the reasons already discussed, the current state of judicial
doctrine—contrasting day-to-day control against creditor enforcement of its
contract protections via conditional waivers and hoping that such a distinc-
tion is real—provides poor guidance. We need a new approach.
III. A Capital Market Approach to Reducing Distortive Creditor
Self-Interest: Old Style
The theory is clear: if a court could find an unconflicted creditor, it
could accord business-judgment deference to a creditor’s business decisions
in influencing a failing firm. The problem is practical, in that such a lack of
conflict, or even a substantial lessening of conflict, seems hard to achieve.
Worse yet, traditional financial structures and traditional bank regulation
have largely impeded such structures from emerging in the United States.
But the unconflicted creditor-in-control is not as far-fetched as it might
at first seem, in light of the new finance of options and derivatives, and
against the background of the concomitant rise of new financial players.
First, though, we will consider how old-style finance could have been
adapted, albeit with much transactional and regulatory difficulty, to the
theory.
A. The Syndicate Leader
Consider a firm with a traditional lending syndicate and stockholder-
managers but with no other major players in the capital structure. Trade
creditors are few, and back taxes have been paid. The firm’s capital structure
initially consists of just the creditors and stockholders.
The firm defaults, and creditors do more than seek to be repaid: they
seek to replace management and influence operating decisions. This setting
occurred in the well-known Farah Manufacturing controversy83 and is in-
structive here. There, the lending syndicate forced out old management after
a bitter labor strike and secondary boycott of the debtor, put a managerial
change clause into its loan agreement (i.e., barring any managerial change to
which the creditors objected), used the managerial change clause to wedge
its preferred managers into place, and induced managers to liquidate major
parts of the firm’s operations.84 The new managers made disastrous operat-
ing decisions that cost everyone in the firm dearly.85 When the original eq-
uity holders eventually regained control of the firm, they had better
83. State Nat’l Bank of El Paso v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984),
appeal dismissed by agreement, Mar. 6, 1985.
84. Id. at 667–68, 672, 678.
85. Id. at 668–69.
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operating results, and they sued the banks on several theories of lender
liability.86
If the firm had a bleak future when the creditors originally seized con-
trol, a liquidation sale of the useless machinery was operationally sensible. If
the bank-appointed managers intended their decisions to be profit maximiz-
ing, however, and if the controlling creditors who appointed those managers
lacked conflicts, then business-judgment judicial deference to the decisions
could have been appropriate. But given the deep conflicts of interest of the
creditors, no such thinking emerged in the Farah Manufacturing litigation.87
Nor, given the lending syndicate’s structure, should it have.
How then could the Farah creditors have not been conflicted? If they
owned the same proportion of equity that they were owed on their loans,
then the debtor–creditor conflict would have approached zero. But the lend-
ers were just about the firm’s only creditors, so a proportional equity inter-
est for them would have required them to own nearly all of it. This was not
possible short of a full-scale bankruptcy and reorganization.
But consider this alternative scenario: El Paso National Bank was the
syndicate leader and made a slice of the total loan to Farah Manufacturing.
What if El Paso, the lead bank, with, say, 10 percent of the lending syndi-
cate’s take-down also owned 10 percent of the debtor’s stock, as Figure 4
illustrates? If it then made managerial decisions that lowered the long-term
value of Farah Manufacturing’s operations (by liquidating too much, too
soon, at fire-sale prices), it would have given up value that it could have
captured through its equity holding. As such, it would have lacked the incen-
tive for such value-diminishing action, which would have damaged its own
total investment. It might have done so mistakenly—just as boards making
managerial decisions sometimes misjudge the business situation—but not
intentionally to further its self-interest.
The potential way out here is now obvious: if El Paso had proportionate
debt and equity interests, if it had been entitled to make all important deci-
sions for the lending syndicate, and if the syndicate’s intercreditor contract
had allowed El Paso to recognize the value to itself of its stock interests when
making operational and managerial decisions, then the reviewing court
could have judged whether the remaining conflicts were really so strong as
to trump business-judgment deference. The central conflict for the creditor
86. Id. at 669. The full facts are more complex, but the text summarizes what is impor-
tant. In the fuller version, the board itself forced out William Farah because “he was the cause
of [Farah Manufacturing’s] management problems and poor financial condition.” Id. at 670.
After Farah resigned, there was a managerial revolving door, with the banks eventually putting
their people in place when they leveraged a loan agreement clause that allowed them to call a
default if there was change in management that they disliked. See id. at 668, 670. Although the
Farah family had a controlling stock interest in the firm, several family members opposed
William Farah’s return to management, leading to intrafamily litigation. See id. at 667–68.
Eventually Farah prevailed in the family litigation and gained voting control of enough family
stock to put himself back in control of the manufacturing company. See id. at 668. When he
regained control, he had the company sue the banks. Id.
87. See id. at 668–70.
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would have been largely mitigated. And if, in the court’s view, the residual
conflicts were weaker or were offset by other factors,88 then a business-judg-
ment review and deference could have been something for the court to con-
sider. Figure 4 illustrates this point.
Figure 4. The Syndicate Leader with Stock Ownership
Assets Liabilities 
$2,000 cash $2,000 banks and other debt 
            [Syndicate leader owns 10 
            percent, or $200, of the debt.] 
Stockholders 
                    [Syndicate leader takes 10 
                    percent of the stock.] 
Scenario 1. The firm is better off continued, as in the first scenario in Figure 3. The syndicate leader has a 50 
percent chance of having its $200 portion of the syndicate’s loan fully repaid and a 50 percent chance of having 
$300 in equity from the firm’s continuance, for an expected value of $250. Hence, even if the liquidation value 
of the firm is $2,000—enough to pay the lenders in full—the syndicate leader’s incentives from its ownership 
interests are to push for the higher value continuance. Liquidation will yield the syndicate leader only $200—
less than the $250 from continuance. 
 
Scenario 2. Alternatively, consider the possibility that the firm is better off liquidated because the top scenario 
in Figure 3 changes to a lower value at [(.5 · 0) + (.5 · $3,000)] = $1,500. The syndicate leader gets $150 from 
continuance, but $200 from liquidation. Again, the syndicate leader’s incentives from its position in the firm’s 
capital structure are to push for the higher value liquidation. 
B. Other Old-Style Ways to Reduce Controlling-Creditor Conflicts
The syndicate leader taking a proportionate interest in the other layers
in the firm’s capital structure is not the only way to implement a corporate
law, capital market approach to creditor conduct.
1. Warrants at the Time of Lending
When the creditors and the debtor negotiate their loan, they may reduce
the creditors’ conflicts of interest by having the syndicate leader take stock
warrants proportionate to its portion of the loan.
The warrants’ exercise price cannot be immediately fixed and exercisable
because when the creditor grants the loan, the firm is usually solvent and
profitable; therefore, the stock price reflects the current value of the com-
pany. The warrants’ value in reducing conflict comes later, only if the firm
declines and bank intervention becomes appropriate.
The central problem with this solution is that when the creditor makes
the loan, neither party particularly wants to sell, buy, or hold warrants. It is
88. For example, El Paso National Bank’s incentive from its equity interest would be
offset in part by its interest in protecting the other members of the syndicate. In this way,
bankers would have confidence that El Paso as syndicate leader would protect the banks first
and foremost so that banks would willingly join a syndicate that El Paso led. This conflict
could deter El Paso National from maximizing the value of its own direct holding in Farah.
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just a structural reserve for a rainy day that may never come. The second
problem is that the parties have to write the terms under which the warrants
“go live” before the firm enters financial stress; the parties will surely write
terms then that will not be ideal later when the stress arises.
2. Convertible Debt
Another way to reduce the controlling creditors’ conflicts of interest is
for the debtor and the creditor, or at least for the lead bank, to use converti-
ble debt. The syndicate leader could convert its debt into equity during the
firm’s financial stress, under terms that would dampen the creditors’
conflicts.
Setting the conversion price would be hit-and-miss for structuring good
incentives during a subsequent workout if the firm faces failure. The lead
bank would need to acquire a right to participate in the share capital of the
debtor that is proportionate to its interest in the loan agreement. The con-
version price would have to be chosen to reflect likely financial stress, but a
low conversion price, if immediately exercisable, becomes a windfall for the
lead bank, without reducing later conflicts of interest. The conversion fea-
ture would have to be unusable until the firm enters financial stress, which
would presumably be indicated by a sharp fall in the firm’s stock price. Get-
ting the terms right ahead of time, when the firm is not in trouble, would
not be easy.
And, again, the convertible debt solution has the problem that when the
loan is originally made, neither the debtor nor the lead bank is otherwise
interested in using this kind of convertible debt.
3. Buying up Proportionate Interests
When the firm enters stress and the bank wants to intervene, the lead
bank could buy enough shares in the market so that its debt position is
proportionate to its newly acquired equity holding. This alternative has the
advantage of not requiring the lead bank to have warrants or conversion
rights from the beginning of the lending relationship because these rights
may be of no use to the parties since most firms do not fail and induce
lender intervention.
However, if the lead bank must buy a big equity position, and if the
market is illiquid or if the creditor has actionable inside information, this
eve-of- or upon-intervention effort may not be easy to accomplish quickly.
And, while this possibility of buying proportionate interests—“strips” in
the finance vernacular—has more promise than the other traditional pos-
sibilities, it faces other difficulties. The syndicate leader may see its incentives
changed by holding proportionate interests, but it is unclear whether its in-
terests would change enough. The syndicate leader, as a repeat player in the
lending market, may prefer to make the rest of the syndicate whole and
could be willing to give up some value elsewhere in the vertical strip it
obtains.
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Some interests may be difficult to buy—tax claims, tort claims, and con-
sumer products claims, for example. In a complex corporate group with
multiple subsidiaries, the proportionate claims on all the related enterprises
will not be easy to create. Creative finance may be able to mimic some, but
not all, of the incentives from these existing nonmarket layers in the capital
structure. But even without a full mimicking, the proportionate interest pos-
sibility is still viable: First, the court could use it to vary the intensity of its
scrutiny—to the extent that it thinks the conflicts are lowered, the court
could lower its scrutiny. Second, if the proportionate interest purchases are
incomplete, the court could use them to vary its deference to those who are
complaining. If the complainant’s claims were not proportionately owned by
the syndicate leader, then the court might give no deference to the leader’s
business judgment. But if another complainant’s claims were proportion-
ately owned by the syndicate leader, then the court could be more likely to
defer to the syndicate leader’s business judgment; the court would know that
the complainant, lacking the proportionate claim that the syndicate leader
had, was more conflicted than the syndicate leader.
C. The Classic Main Bank System and Its Relevance
Several of these conflict-reducing features have been present in the Japa-
nese main bank system.
1. How the Classic Main Bank System Resembles the Capital Market,
Corporate Law Approach
In the immediate post–World War II decades, Japan’s main banks were
active in their debtors’ decisionmaking, especially when the debtors became
distressed.89 The main bank provided significant credit to the borrower and
led a syndicate of major banks in lending to the debtor firm.90 If the debtor
firm began to fail, the main bank would take over the firm, sending in per-
sonnel to make or review basic business decisions.91 The main bank lent to
the debtor and owned the debtor’s stock.92
The classic main bank system has been described as a system of contin-
gent control: the main bank was typically inactive in corporate governance
89. Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan,
11 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 399, 407 (1989) (arguing that the main “bank will often intervene
in . . . the management of the firm when it is not performing adequately or is in need of some
kind of restructuring”).
90. Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Liter-
ature 1, 14 (1990).
91. Id.
92. See Sheard, supra note 89, at 401–02 (presenting the main bank as “maintain[ing]
the largest share among private financial institutions of loans to a particular firm” and as
“typically [being] a principal shareholder in the firm”).
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when the firm did well but became active if the firm entered distress.93 One
might wonder why Japanese banks were more active in distressed firm deci-
sionmaking. The operating firms’ capital structure may explain why.94
The classic main bank typically owned a major stake of the debtor-
firm’s equity.95 It also was said to have acquired expertise about the debtor’s
business.96 By owning both debt and equity layers of the operating firm’s
capital structure, it reduced conflicts of interest in workouts and had incen-
tives to maximize overall enterprise value. When the firm needed special
assistance, main banks had “their own executives help [the debtor] out of
difficulty.”97 And the ongoing relationships were close outside of bank-
ruptcy: bank personnel “move[d] frequently between banks and companies
as part of an on-going relationship that involves training, consulting, and
monitoring.”98 Debtor chief financial officers frequently came from the main
bank. “Japanese banks allow companies to enter formal bankruptcy only
when liquidation makes economic sense—that is, when a company is worth
more dead than alive.”99
The capital market, corporate law approach we use here mimics the
classic main bank role for distressed debtors. A nonconflicted creditor, with
a proportionate interest in all layers of the debtor’s capital structure, will
have the same incentive to maximize the firm’s value in the workout as the
Japanese main bank was said to have had. Moreover, the fact that the credi-
tor lacked large conflicts of interest should have reassured market players
that a professional investor was participating in the debtor’s turnaround or
93. Id. at 407–08. Classic main bank theory has been criticized as far from main bank
reality. See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Compar-
ative Corporate Governance, 27 L. & Soc. Inquiry 401 (2002).
94. It was this contrast between main bank ownership in the 1990s and weak overlying
duties with the American banking structure and overlying duties that set one of the authors at
that time to begin to consider the problem of creditor conduct, ownership, and creditor duties
impediments to constructive creditor activism.
95. Sheard, supra note 89, at 401–02.
96. See id. at 403 (“The cornerstone of the main bank system is the close information-
sharing relationship that exists between the bank and the firm.”).
97. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct.
1989 (revised 1997), at 26, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=146149.
98. Id.
99. Id.; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871, 881 (1993) (ex-
amining the informational and incentive mechanisms that facilitate nonjudicial restructurings
in the main bank system); see also The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for
Developing and Transforming Economies 190 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994)
(“A feature of the main bank system is that, unlike formal bankruptcy, the process is handled
informally without recourse to the courts and without a change in the legal standing of the
firm: in effect, the main bank replaces the judge and the court-appointed receiver; but like
bankruptcy a range of asset reorganization outcomes is possible, not just restructuring of the
enterprise and continuation as a going concern—as the popular term ‘bank rescues’ con-
notes—but also varying degrees of liquidation.”).
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liquidation process. The German banking and corporate structure was simi-
lar: major banks owned and controlled equity in their debtor firms.100
2. How It Differs
Before Japan’s deregulation of the 1980s, the Japanese main banks rep-
resented a stable power center in the Japanese keiretsu business groups.101
The classic main banks were thought to have extracted value from their cli-
ents and to have unwisely influenced the operating firms when no financial
stress was present.102 Overall, some thought that the main banks were more
of a burden than a benefit for Japanese firms.103 And whatever it did in
aligning banker incentives with the incentives of others in the enterprise, the
main bank system did not prevent corporate decay in Japan.
Unlike the main bank system, the capital market, corporate law ap-
proach would directly affect corporate governance only when firms are in
distress. In such situations, creditors’ leverage to affect debtors’ decisions
would rise dramatically. The capital market, corporate law approach would
put in place good incentives to minimize creditors’ self-serving behavior
without permanently modifying the debtors’ corporate governance struc-
tures during nonstress, normal financial times.
3. Why American Banks Could Not Have Become Main Banks
Due to the Glass–Steagall Act, the National Bank Act, and the Bank
Holding Company Act, American banks—as well as bank holding compa-
nies—are generally barred from taking the relevant equity positions in non-
bank companies and from controlling industrial firms.104 There are,
however, considerable exceptions to these constraints for stocks acquired in
the ordinary course of collecting a debt previously contracted (“DPC”).105
The United States also has a long history of keeping banks small in ways that
100. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 Stan. L.
Rev. 73, 87–88 (1995).
101. Xueping Wu & Jun Yao, Understanding the Rise and Decline of the Japanese Main
Bank System: The Changing Effects of Bank Rent Extraction, 36 J. Banking & Fin. 36, 36–37
(2012). The classic keiretsu arose in postwar Japan. It was a group of companies—usually
centered around a main bank—with the constituent companies owning cross-participations,
meeting regularly, and coordinating their business activities.
102. Id. at 83–84, 96.
103. See The Japanese Main Banking System, supra note 99, at 210–12; Miguel A.
Ferreira & Pedro Matos, Universal Banks and Corporate Control: Evidence from the Global Syn-
dicated Loan Market, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 2703, 2704–06 (2012); Wu & Yao, supra note 101, at
36–37.
104. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 335, 1843(a), 1843(c)(6), 1843(c)(8) (2006).
105. 12 U.S.C. §§ 29, 1843(c)(2).
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made the banks unable to participate powerfully in corporate governance,106
despite evidence that when they could participate (before being ousted),
they created value.107
Banks are allowed to negotiate with borrowers in distress to exchange
nonperforming loans for otherwise bank-banned equity, but only “to re-
solve a troubled credit situation in which the bank otherwise would face
credit losses.”108 The banks must then dispose of the instruments acquired
within five years.109
Since the 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, American banking law ex-
panded authority for the banks’ affiliates to own equity. But the banking
law, even after the 1999 Act, still requires that the equity holdings be for
“investment purposes” only, and it prohibits the bank from routinely man-
aging nonfinancial firms.110
IV. A Capital Market Approach to Reducing Distortive Creditor
Self-Interest: New-Style Derivatives
What once was hard to accomplish via old-style financial instruments or
impossible to accomplish due to bank regulation is now easier to accomplish
via new-style derivatives handled by new-style activist hedge funds. While
extensive academic work now shows the potential pernicious conflicts that
the new-style financial instruments can create, we can turn this thinking
inside out to see how this new finance presents opportunities as well as chal-
lenges. Empty voting, for example, has captured reformers’ attention, as the
106. Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of
American Corporate Finance 54–59 (1994); see also Laura Lin, The Information Content of
a Bank’s Involvement in Private Workouts, 3 Geo. Mason Indep. L. Rev. 97, 118–19 (1994).
107. J. Bradford De Long, Did J.P. Morgan’s Men Add Value?: An Economist’s Perspective
on Financial Capitalism, in Inside the Business Enterprise 205, 205 (Peter Temin ed., 1991)
(“[In the pre–World War I period] investment banker representation on boards allowed bank-
ers to assess the performance of firm managers, quickly replace managers whose performance
was unsatisfactory, and signal to investors that a company was fundamentally sound.”); see
also Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, J. Applied
Corp. Fin., Spring 1989, at 35–36.
108. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Letter No. 1007
(Sept. 7, 2004), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/interpretations-and-precedents/sep04/
int1007.pdf.
109. 12 C.F.R. § 1.7(b)–(d) (2012).
110. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on Financial Holding Companies
Under the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act 22 (2003) (“[The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act] permits
an FHC [Financial Holding Company] to routinely manage or operate a portfolio company
when, and for the period, necessary or required to obtain a reasonable return on the FHC’s
investment in the portfolio company. . . . However, to ensure that an FHC does not routinely
manage or operate a portfolio company for an extended period [of] time, the rule requires
that an FHC notify the [Federal Reserve] Board if it routinely manages or operates a portfolio
company for more than nine months.”); Paul J. Polking & Scott A. Cammarn, Overview of the
Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, 4 N.C. Banking Inst. 1, 4–6 (2000); João A.C. Santos & Adrienne
S. Rumble, The American Keiretsu and Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on
Nonfinancials’ Corporate Boards, 80 J. Fin. Econ. 419, 427 (2006).
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new finance of derivatives and options facilitates the possibility of stockhold-
ers who command decisive votes but who lack any underlying economic
stake in the enterprise.
There is also considerable literature, and considerable real world experi-
ence, on how the new finance of derivatives and options can mask a credi-
tor’s conflicting financial position in a firm, to the detriment of sound
corporate decisionmaking. These analytics are correct to show the dangers of
the new finance for sound corporate decisionmaking.111 Here, we show how
courts could harness the new finance to better ends by more sturdily align-
ing strong financial interests in firms with their firms’ overall health.
Potential positives of the new finance in corporate governance are less
frequently seen.112 Here, we show how an inventive judiciary could harness
these new instruments to reduce conflicts of interest and could construct a
more functional set of judicial doctrines on lender liability. We do not deny
the serious design problems that would need to be overcome to make the
doctrinal safe harbor viable and verifiable by the judiciary as substantially
eviscerating serious conflict. But, we maintain, what was once impossible is
now possible.
A. Equity Options
One problem with using old-style equity to reduce creditor conflict is
that the creditors do not want it, and stockholders may not wish to issue
equity to the creditors or syndicate leader. Each side, at the time of the
111. Professors Hu and Black have some of the more widely cited analytics here. See
Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance
and Extensions, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625, 732 (2008) (“[A]n empty creditor may . . . force . . . [a]
bankruptcy, rather than agree to a restructuring, because the bankruptcy filing will trigger a
contractual payoff on its swap position.”); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 811 (2006)
[hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying].
The pernicious impact has been more widely analyzed. See Viral V. Acharya & Timothy
C. Johnson, Insider Trading in Credit Derivatives, 84 J. Fin. Econ. 110 (2007); Jonathan C.
Lipson, The Shadow Bankruptcy System, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 1609 (2009); Stephen J. Lubben,
Credit Derivatives and the Future of Chapter 11, 81 Am. Bankr. L.J. 405, 427–30 (2007); Frank
Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1019, 1035 (2007) (“[A] lender that has purchased credit default swaps may have an incentive
to use its position as a lender to affirmatively destroy value.”); András Danis, Do Empty Credi-
tors Matter? Evidence from Distressed Exchange Offers (Feb. 27, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2001467 (showing data indicating that firms
subject to extensive credit default guarantees of its debt are less able to effectuate an effective
out-of-court workout to avoid bankruptcy); Marti G. Subrahmanyam et al., Does the Tail Wag
the Dog? The Effect of Credit Default Swaps on Credit Risk 29 (Dec. 8, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/msubrahm/papers/EmptyCreditor.pdf
(“We find strong evidence that the bankruptcy risk of reference firms increases after the incep-
tion of CDS trading.”).
112. For two articles seeing positives, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Derivative Securities
and Corporate Governance, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (2002), and Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K.
Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Mar-
kets, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 231 (2008).
October 2013] A Capital Market, Corporate Law Approach 97
lending, may recognize the potential future efficiency of the firm’s having an
influential creditor with reduced conflicts. But the costs to the lender of
holding equity to facilitate reconstruction upon firm failure, when most
firms do not fail, can readily exceed the expected value of anticipatorily
building an unconflicted structure that will frequently remain fallow.
Another problem is that while building up such a debt–equity holding
may make sense as the firm fails, it could prove daunting for the creditor
and the firm to negotiate that equity issuance during financial stress. If the
lender and debtor wait until stress arises to negotiate the creditor’s purchase
of the conflict-reducing equity, the equity transaction will most likely be
bundled with the creditor’s collection efforts and operational goals. The
debtor firm and its management may wish to neutralize the creditor’s ac-
tions and, thus, would not issue the equity. The creditor, not yet with its
incentives aligned, may use its muscle perniciously to extract equity on
terms that disfavor the other creditors and equity-holders.
But options on equity could be easier to use. If the syndicate leader has,
say, 10 percent of the firm’s debt, then it could buy options on equity from
third parties in an amount roughly equal to 10 percent of the firm’s equity,
at a strike price approximating the then-current price of the equity, with an
expiration date around when the crisis is expected to be resolved one way or
the other. One big advantage of such options is that the firm’s management
(presumably representing stockholders) and the creditor need not make a
crisis-infected agreement, which they would find hard to reach. Instead the
creditor can buy the right level of options from third-party market players
and then can take an aggressive activist stance vis-à-vis the firm, confident
that courts would be likely to accord the creditor business-judgment
deference.113
B. Options on Other Debt Layers
Thus far, we have focused for simplicity on creditor–stockholder con-
flict. In a complex firm, there will be more than one creditor layer, and it is
here where the most pernicious creditor difficulties arise. Banks may have
short-term secured debt, while bondholders have long-term subordinated
debt, and trade creditors short-term unsecured but not subordinated debt.
The activist creditor could have reason to squeeze out these other layers to
its own benefit.
To reduce such conflicts, the syndicate leader could take proportionate
interests in each of the other major layers, or it could take out options on
those layers, so that it pays proportionately if it squeezes these layers out.
113. The option mechanism when perfectly implemented tells the court that the con-
trolling creditor has no direct financial incentive to reduce firm value because doing so would
reduce the value of its overall investment in the firm. Even if there are equally valued alterna-
tives, with one favoring one layer and another favoring another layer, the controlling creditor
with appropriately sized options has no direct, incentive-based financial reason to favor one
over the other.
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C. Credit Default Swaps
The activist creditor could similarly reduce intercreditor conflict by
writing credit default swaps on the other major credit layers. That is, if the
activist creditor has 10 percent of one credit layer, it could write swaps on 10
percent of the bond layer, such that if the bonds fall below X price, the
activist would have to pay the difference. Thus motivated, the activist would
have less reason to shift value to itself from the bond layer.
D. Implementation Limits
The activist creditor could face implementation problems in buying op-
tions on multiple layers. For some creditors in some firms, the purchase of
the vertical strip could be too expensive for the added leeway the strip would
afford the creditor; the creditor may prefer to take its chances under the
current doctrines. Some layers may be hard to value, so the costs of an op-
tions writer assessing, pricing, and then selling the options may be prohibi-
tive. Untraded debt (say, to the debtor’s suppliers) may also be hard to
assess. And further difficulties can arise if the firm has substantial debt that
is hard to define, such as from mass tort claims, tax claims, customers’
claims for breach of warranty, or even soft claims not generally recognized
in bankruptcy, including from employees’ or customers’ noncontractual ex-
pectations of future dealings.
Worse, potentially, is a second implementation problem: some strong
creditors will game the system by taking on derivatives positions that appear
to make them aligned with the overall health of the firm, but whose fine-
print terms in fact do not give it those incentives. These wrongdoings may
be hard to uncover. Courts will, as always, need to be alert and sophisticated.
They may over time need to develop templates of acceptable and unaccept-
able terms for such creditor efforts to build vertical strips.
1. Transaction Costs of the Activist Creditor
These implementation problems are not assuredly insurmountable;
moreover, even if they cannot be surmounted for some firms, they do not
render the capital market approach valueless.
First, the companies here are in financial distress, which often makes
many of the options and derivatives on other capital layers inexpensive. Sec-
ond, sometimes these hard-to-value and nonfinancial soft claims are small
and therefore not critical to the creditor’s incentives and decisionmaking,
and therefore not critical in the court’s review of the extent the creditor was
conflicted in its decisionmaking.
Third, the court could accord business-judgment deference to the strong
creditor if it takes proportionate interests, but only to the extent that it takes
them. That is, if the strong creditor obtains proportionate interests in the
subordinated debentures and equity, the court should be inclined to give it
business-judgment deference if those players complain. If the dominant
creditor has not taken a proportionate interest in the company’s asbestos
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mass tort liability, however, the court should be ready to hear the tort claim-
ants (but not the bondholders or equity holders) without according the
creditor a business-judgment defense as to the dominant creditor’s dealings
that affected the tort claimants.
Fourth, on the possibility that strong creditors will game the system by
reporting that they have taken a vertical strip when they have set up a struc-
ture that is difficult for the court to decode, since the creditor would pre-
sumably have the burden of showing that it was not conflicted, such a
complex structure would fail to satisfy the court. Presumably if the doctrine
took hold, eventually courts would develop templates to use with deviations
requiring explanation. And, even if it is possible that some strong creditors
will try to game the system by misstating their real interests in the different
layers of the debtors’ capital structure, fraud and misrepresentation to the
court is a serious offense. Much in law, litigation, and transactional integrity
needs to limit fraud, usually by punishing its occurrence severely. The cor-
porate law, capital market analytic here is no different. Activist creditors will
carefully consider the risks of criminal sanctions before disclosing false in-
formation to the court about their economic interests in the firm. Courts
and corporate law do not reject the business-judgment rule’s efficacy just
because there is a possibility that some directors will misstate the level of
their financial interest in the transactions at hand.
There is another relevant implementation issue. Corporate business-
judgment decisions tend to be binary—if the decisionmaker is sufficiently
unbiased, it gets full business-judgment deference.114 Importing the busi-
ness-judgment concept into the creditor-liability area must be more
nuanced, as the capital market opportunities outlined here can go a long
way to eliminating some conflicts with some creditors but not all conflicts
with all creditors.
2. Creditor Fallback from the Safe Harbor
For some creditors, the cost–benefit trade-off may be unfavorable. They
may find it too expensive to pick up proportionate interests in the firm’s
other creditor layers, just to protect their managerial activism from later
judicial challenge with the safe harbor we propose. Some creditors may pre-
fer to take their chances on the old-style current rules, hoping that no one
will complain or that they will find their conduct evaluated by a sympathetic
court.
3. Judicial Limits in Verifying the Quality of the Safe Harbor
A law review article can set forth the concept, but a court would have to
verify the actual on-the-ground terms, some of which will be difficult to
assess. Some creditors may not take on the proportionate risks; others may
114. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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take them on but offload them surreptitiously. More prosaically, once a ver-
tical strip is assembled, the debtor may retire some debt, issue new debt, or
incur new liabilities. These changes could affect whether the controlling
creditor remains only weakly conflicted in its decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, despite these implementation limits, courts will often find
it easier to verify that a credit default swap is a real risk for the dominant
creditor than to evaluate the business value of the creditor’s actions. In the
boardroom context, courts have been dealing for decades with the problem
of assessing the real independence of the decisionmaking subcommittee to
see whether to apply the business-judgment rule and thereby avoid the diffi-
culty of assessing the business sense of the underlying decision. The capital
market approach here is not without difficulties, but difficulties in assessing
the bona fide structure of the transaction for which creditors are seeking
business-judgment deference will be easier for courts than the difficulties of
assessing the entire fairness of the underlying business transaction.
4. The Safe Harbor as Infectious Agent
We have proposed the corporate law analogue as a safe harbor for ac-
tivist creditors because it channels creditor incentives into improving the
firm and away from grabbing value from other creditors. If the safe harbor
did not prove valuable enough, as we see the situation, the creditor would
not seek the safe harbor, and the court would evaluate the creditor under the
current standards.
But once the safe harbor is introduced, it stands as an alternative to the
current (muddied) standards governing activist creditor conduct. Some
courts may be unhappy if active, dominant creditors damage the debtor and
get a free pass under the jurisdiction’s existing doctrine if the creditor has
influenced but not taken control of the firm. Such courts may adopt the safe
harbor standard as mandatory and look for proportionate interests to vali-
date the actions of every activist creditor, in effect replacing the current
standard with our proposed safe harbor. But if such courts looked for verti-
cal strips owned by the activist creditor, and too many creditors found it too
expensive to acquire those vertical strips, then a safe harbor that became a de
facto minimal entry expense for the activist creditor would damage
debtor–creditor relations, not ameliorate them.
Potentially activist creditors in this infectious scenario would stay quiet
if (1) the vertical strip were too expensive, and (2) courts abandoned the old
doctrines and required activist creditors to have the (expensive) vertical strip
or submit to heavy liability. Although a safe harbor could mutate to become
mandatory, we do hope that such a change would occur only after enough
experience with the proposed safe harbor, with courts and activist creditors
finding that it provided more low-cost incentive alignment than even we
predict.
There is an offsetting, more positive potential reaction by the courts: in
the face of the broad use of a new safe harbor, some courts could try to do
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better in examining the safe harbored transactions, seeking better doctrinal
categories for evaluating activist creditors.
E. Hedge Fund Activism
In today’s restructuring world, banking syndicate leaders do not loom as
large as they once did. Bankers often lend and then sell their loans to other
market participants.115 Even if they do not sell, banks are still not well situ-
ated in the regulatory framework to take multiple positions in the failing
firm’s capital structure when those positions involve equity stakes.
Yet modern capital markets offer an opportunity here. Oftentimes when
the operating firm weakens, hedge funds, which do not face the same regula-
tory hurdles that traditional bank lenders face here,116 acquire distressed
debt. Then, with their industry and operating expertise,117 their negotiating
skills, and their taste for financial combat,118 they induce operating and fi-
nancing decisions in the target firm that favor the hedge fund, either by
115. Donald S. Bernstein, Toward a New Corporate Reorganization Paradigm, J. Applied
Corp. Fin., Fall 2007, at 8, 11–12; Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense of
Claims Trading, 4 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 67, 67 (2009) (“The creation of a market in
bankruptcy claims is the single most important development in the bankruptcy world since
the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment in 1978.”); Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than
Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 191, 200–09. With regard to the growth of assets managed by hedge
funds, see Kahan & Rock, supra note 67, at 282, and Juliet Chung, Hedge-Fund Assets Rise to
Record Level, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304331204577354043852093400.html#.
116. For now, at least. See Petition for Rulemaking Under Section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secre-
tary, SEC (Mar. 7, 2011), which proposed disclosure rules for hedge fund acquisitions of a
kind that could impede hedge funds from acquiring multiple financial layers at an attractive
cost. For the costs of the proposal in deterring useful investor checks on management, see
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 40 (2012).
117. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, J. Econ.
Persp., Winter 2009, at 121, 132 (2009) (“Today, most large private equity firms have . . .
industry and operating expertise that they apply to add value to their investments. Indeed,
most top private equity firms are now organized around industries. . . . [P]rivate equity firms
now often hire professionals with operating backgrounds and an industry focus. . . . [and they]
also make use of internal or external consulting groups.”); see also Viral V. Acharya et al.,
Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity, 26 Rev. Fin. Stud. 368
(2013).
118. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 67, at 295 (“[H]edge fund activism is strategic:
Hedge funds invest in order to become active, and the activism is designed to generate gains
rather than reduce [losses]. . . . By contrast, activism by traditional institutions is incidental to
their investment activities. Traditional institutions tend to become active when an investment
they hold for different reasons suffers a significant decline in value, and their activism is de-
signed to recoup some of these losses.”). On hedge fund activism generally, see also William
W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. L.J. 1375, 1381 (2007); Thomas W.
Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J.
Corp. L. 681, 682–84 (2007); Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future
of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. Corp. L. 51, 56–58 (2011); Christopher P. Clif-
ford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. Corp. Fin. 323,
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shifting value to the hedge fund or by inducing the firm to operate better
than before.119
Three economists examining a sample of 474 Chapter 11 cases from
1996 to 2007 found evidence that is
more supportive of efficiency gains brought by hedge funds than of value
extraction from other claims. The presence of hedge fund unsecured credi-
tors is associated with both higher total debt (including secured and un-
secured) recovery and a more positive stock market response at the time of
a bankruptcy filing, suggesting a positive effect of hedge fund creditors on
the firm’s total value. . . . Similarly, [they] show that hedge funds partici-
pating in bankruptcy do not have as short a horizon as their counterparts
specialized in pure trading. These hedge funds benefit more from compa-
nies’ emergence, where the long-term prospects of the firm are
important.120
Hedge funds can create value in distress situations by overcoming a
dominant secured creditors’ liquidation bias, thereby increasing the likeli-
hood that the firm emerges from bankruptcy, reassuring the market that the
firm will survive, signaling that sophisticated financiers think that the firm is
survivable, removing some managers while retaining others,121 reducing the
time spent in Chapter 11, and providing liquidity for companies that cannot
find other lenders.122 But the most important finding is that, according to
recent studies, many hedge funds’ investment strategy privileges the long-
term prospects of the firms.123 The purpose here is to find judicial doctrines
325 (2008); and April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds
and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 225 (2009).
119. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target
Firm’s Existing Bondholders, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1735, 1766 (2011) (finding that activist hedge
funds with equity positions damage bondholders); Lipson, supra note 82, at 1038.
120. Wei Jiang et al., Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. Fin. 513, 515 (2012). For
similar conclusions, see Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729, 1773–74 (2008); Edith
S. Hotchkiss & Robert M. Mooradian, Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed
Firms, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 401, 404 (1997); and Jongha Lim, The Role of Activist Hedge Funds in
Distressed Firms (June 18, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors) (report-
ing that in a sample of 184 financially distressed firms for the period from 1998 to 2009, hedge
funds often shortened the time needed to alleviate financial distress).
121. Jiang et al., supra note 120, at 555.
122. David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort?, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud.
541, 543 (2009); Michelle M. Harner, The Corporate Governance and Public Policy Implications
of Activist Distressed Debt Investing, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 703, 753 (2008); Suniati Yap, Invest-
ing in Chapter 11 Companies: Vultures or White Knights?, 2 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 153, 157–61
(1995) (“[W]hen investors infuse new capital in the debtor, it often serves as a ‘catalyst for a
restructuring’ and may be the debtor’s only chance for survival.” (footnote omitted) (quoting
Hilary Rosenberg, The Vulture Investors 300 (1992))); Goldschmid, supra note 116, at
249–55.
123. Jiang et al., supra note 120, at 554; Goldschmid, supra note 115, at 267–74. But see,
for their negative potential, Michelle M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Bar-
barian at the Gate?, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 155, 158 (2011); Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying,
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that will encourage this constructive, value-enhancing action and discourage
destructive, value-shifting activity.
Indeed, the increased volatility in creditor instruments, trading, and
control has heightened problems of, and potential for, creditor control. But
while creditor control capacity has increased, the judicial doctrine has not
adapted to the new business reality and has not yet found ways to channel
the increasing creditor activity into the positive, value-enhancing mecha-
nisms and away from the negative, value-diminishing mechanisms.124 Lend-
ers have become more active than they were before.125 “The crucial question
[then becomes] the extent to which private lenders’ self-interest is aligned
with the interests of all the investors in the corporation.”126 We have pro-
posed here theory, doctrine, and mechanisms to facilitate that alignment.
A court could be more satisfied with the hedge fund’s business judg-
ment if the hedge fund bought not just one strategic layer of debt with
which it would be active but also proportionate interests in, or options on,
or credit default swaps on, analogous portions of the target firm’s other debt
and equity. The new finance of derivatives, options, and credit default swaps
makes it possible to construct a creditor that is sufficiently free from conflict
that business-judgment deference is possible. Judicial doctrine should adapt.
And the new finance of hedge funds acquiring debt instead of banks
holding loans makes it possible that activist creditors can emerge who are
not as limited as banks are in their portfolio choice—as the Glass–Steagall
Act, the National Bank Act, and the Bank Holding Company Act have tradi-
tionally limited deposit-taking banks but do not limit the new deposit-free
hedge funds.127 With bank regulation no longer circumscribing portfolio
choice of the powerful new finance lender, it becomes possible to use the
supra note 111, at 821–22; Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware
Myth, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1987, 2016 (2002).
124. See Hu & Westbrook, supra note 62, at 1354; Kahan & Rock, supra note 67, at 283.
Lipson states:
Unlike heavily regulated banks and institutional lenders of the past, today’s creditors are
professional distress investors (e.g. hedge funds, private equity funds, investment banks),
which are largely unregulated for these purposes. Being unregulated, they have far greater
latitude in what they can do for—or to—distressed firms and their stakeholders. . . .
[P]rivate investors can hold complex, heterogeneous sets of claims against, or affecting, a
distressed firm. They can, for example, hold debt and equity of various tranches, as well
as derivative securities, such as credit default swaps and equity short sales. Such complex
holdings may . . . reflect a desire to obtain the so-called “fulcrum” position: the maxi-
mum control for the minimum investment in the firm. . . . [Furthermore,] private inves-
tors are not a firm’s original lenders, but instead purchase debt claims at a discount on a
secondary market.
Lipson, supra note 82, at 1038–39 (footnotes omitted).
125. See Baird & Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, supra note 66, at 676.
126. Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 50, at 1245.
127. See Jiang et al., supra note 120, at 516–17; Lim, supra note 120, at 10–11 (“[H]edge
funds can enjoy great . . . flexibility as to the securities they can hold and investments they can
make. . . . Unlike conventional financial institutions, hedge funds are not burdened by most
regulatory schemes, oversight, or reporting requirements due to the fact that they [sic] open to
only a limited range of ‘accredited’ or ‘qualified’ investors. . . . For example, unlike other
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new finance of derivatives to construct the nonconflicted (or, more realisti-
cally, only weakly conflicted) creditor-in-control.
A bank could not take active positions such as those that Figure 5 illus-
trates. A modern hedge fund, however, could.
Figure 5. Hedge Fund Activism with Credit Default Swaps and
Equity Options: A “Vertical Strip”
Time (1) 
Assets Liabilities 
$1,000 value $1,000 secured debt (but security is less than $1,000) 
 $1,000 trade debt and bonds 
 Stockholders 
Time (2) 
Hedge fund buys 10 percent of secured debt and seeks to influence the failing firm’s strategic 
direction. 
Assets Liabilities 
$1,000 value $100 hedge fund $   900 other secured 
  $1,000 trade and bonds 
  Stockholders 
Time (3) 
Hedge fund acquires a vertical strip. 
Assets Liabilities 
$1,000 value $100 hedge fund $   900 other secured 
 $100 hedge fund owns 
         credit default swap on 
         unsecured debt (it will 
         pay $100 to a third 
         party if trade creditor 
         not paid) 
$1,000 trade and bonds 
  10% hedge fund buys 
         options on 10% of 
         firm’s stock 
Stockholders 
At time (2), the activist hedge fund acquires a single layer in the capital structure but has incentives at odds with 
raising the firm’s overall value. By time (3), the hedge fund has obtained proportionate interests in each of the 
three capital layers. Its incentives emanating from its capital positions are consistent with maximizing the firm’s 
value. 
F. Similar Situational Conflicts and Solutions
We believe that we are the first to show how corporate law doctrine
points toward a way to reduce the creditor conflict difficulties in theory and
how modern financial instruments and institutions provide the potential for
a practical application. We have, however, seen similar observations of how
investment advisers, hedge funds do not have diversification requirement. . . . Moreover, un-
like other financial institutions hedge funds have no restriction on the ‘riskiness’ of their
portfolios.”).
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corporate players can hold multiple financial instruments and thereby re-
duce their conflicts.
Frederick Tung shows that, during the recent financial crisis, bank man-
agers who owned debt-like claims on their financial institution steered their
institutions through the financial storms more safely than managers who did
not.128 In a complementary fashion, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann
show that bank executives with substantial equity investments had reason to,
and did, take socially excessive risks with the bank, with the potential sys-
temic impact of that excessive risk-taking borne by others outside the
bank.129 Presumably if such managers held debt-like claims as well as equity,
their interests would better align with the public interest. To achieve this
result, Sallie Krawcheck, a well-known bank executive, proposes to restruc-
ture bank managers’ compensation to align their incentives with the bank
overall. In particular, according to Krawcheck,
A simple but powerful way for boards to alter the risk appetite of senior
bank executives would be to add fixed-income instruments to the compen-
sation equation. Any shift in this direction would have an impact, but the
most logical end point would be a compensation mix that mirrors the bank’s
capital structure. Thus, as bank financial leverage (and therefore financial
risk) increased, senior executives would be motivated to become more risk-
averse.130
And Yair Listokin proposes that bankruptcy trustees get unsecured debt to
align the trustees’ incentives with the overall value of the firm:
Debt compensation in bankruptcy improves the incentives of managers to
make efficient decisions before bankruptcy. The plan accomplishes this
goal by effectively granting the creditors some oversight of the manager.
With debt compensation, decisions that hurt the value of debt potentially
hurt the manager. Any given percentage of debt will be worth less if the
manager makes inefficient decisions before bankruptcy. In addition, the
manager knows that the creditors will decide whether or not to adopt debt
compensation, as well as the appropriate percentage award. Creditors are
128. Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation
for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1205, 1228 (2011) (“Giving managers a stake in the
value of the firm’s debt makes them less willing to sacrifice its value to benefit shareholders.
This is especially important when the firm is in distress. Debt compensation can improve
managerial effort and firm value in distress situations because, unlike equity, debt is sensitive
to the firm’s liquidation value. That is, debtholders may still recover value when the firm is in
distress. By contrast, equity is worthless once the firm is insolvent. Managers holding inside
debt may therefore be less inclined to make risky bets when the firm gets into trouble.” (foot-
note omitted)).
129. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 Geo. L.J. 247
(2010).
130. Sallie Krawcheck, Four Ways to Fix Banks, Harv. Bus. Rev., June 2012, at 107,
http://hbr.org/2012/06/four-ways-to-fix-banks/ar/1 (emphasis added). For a careful academic
analysis of the possibility, see Tung, supra note 128.
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unlikely to award debt compensation if they feel that the manager has
made inefficient decisions in the pre-bankruptcy period.131
* * *
We have sought safe harbor principles that could only improve the in-
centives now governing creditor conduct because safe harbored players who
do not like the rules that would emerge, or who find them expensive to use,
could fall back on the current rules. But we concede that some configuration
of possibilities could undermine this goal. If creditors will only lend initially
if they can liquidate the company upon default, with no questions asked of
them; and if they cannot fall back on the current rules (because the safe
harbor erodes the vitality of the existing rules); and if suing on their con-
tract for repayment (without taking control of the debtor) is not good
enough to get the creditor its contracted-for liquidation value; and if the
acquisition of vertical strips in the debtor is prohibitively expensive, then, if
all of the foregoing possibilities come to pass, our rule would fail to improve
the status quo ante. But such a simultaneous confluence of multiple difficul-
ties is unlikely. And there remains the possibility—which we do not here
explore—that replacing the current rules with the incentivized alternative
we propose as a safe harbor may eventually improve overall lending prac-
tices and restructuring results.
Conclusion
The business world is as financially volatile as ever. Yet the doctrines
that courts use to evaluate creditor activity that goes beyond basic loan col-
lection have not been updated either for the riskier world we live in or for
the twenty-first century’s new capital market instruments and institutions.
The new instruments and the new institutions provide the opportunity to
better guide creditor action inside troubled firms.
The first step is to recognize that the existing doctrines do not address
themselves to facilitating efficacious management of the failing firm. Yet
with corporate and economic volatility as important as ever, doctrines
should seek to be more functional.
The second step in updating these creditor conduct doctrines is to rec-
ognize that the existing doctrines are deeply contradictory. Courts pose the
alternative of the creditor perniciously taking day-to-day control of the firm
(and thereby acquiring easy-to-breach fiduciary duties to other creditors or
to the firm itself) against the alternative of the creditor simply protecting its
previously negotiated contract rights (and thereby owing no duties to other
creditors). The difficulty is that the permitted contract could lead to perni-
cious day-to-day control. And even without day-to-day control, the creditor
131. Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compen-
sated with Debt, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 777, 830 (2007); see also Alex Edmans & Qi Liu, Inside
Debt, 15 Rev. Fin. 75, 92 (2011). But see criticism of this kind of compensation inside bank-
ruptcy as unnecessary and hard to implement, in Adam J. Levitin, The Problematic Case for
Incentive Compensation in Bankruptcy, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 88 (2007).
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could push the firm to self-liquidate and destroy value, even if the creditor
stayed at arm’s-length from day-to-day control.
While deference to contract could trump all judicial decisionmaking
here, in most settings that are of interest, the contract is silent—with the
specific creditor action not fully contemplated by the contract—or the cred-
itor action affects other creditors that were not party to the contract. For
example, the debtor may be in default under a financial ratio, and the credi-
tor may seek under its contract to collect. That kind of action should give
rise to no special obligations of the creditor under current or updated doc-
trines. But if the creditor offers to forbear, if the debtor liquidates its major
facility, to the detriment of trade, tort, and governmental creditors, we now
have contradictory doctrines governing that behavior. Moreover, even if the
contract gives the creditor carte blanche, we should want mechanisms that
would facilitate a Coasian ex post rebargaining to deploy the firm as effi-
ciently as possible. Our proposal is for a safe harbor that would internalize
enough of the Coasian incentives into a single player so that the Coasian
results would be achieved more often than they are now.
The third step is to recognize that corporate law has long dealt with
similar situations when articulating board-based fiduciary duties. The
stripped-down version of corporate law’s fiduciary duty rule is that courts
will defer to a board’s business judgment if the board is not substantially
conflicted in its decisionmaking. If the board has serious conflicts of interest
and cannot extricate itself from those conflicts by delegating decisionmaking
to a subcommittee, then the court will take over the decision from the board
and evaluate the board’s actions for their entire fairness. Until now, there
has been little reason to assess the severity of conflicts in the creditor setting
for a deferential judicial review because the activist creditor’s conflicts were
obvious, pernicious, and irremediable. Hence, courts rightly jumped to the
creditor-in-control equivalent of entire fairness review.
The last step is to recognize that modern capital markets can substan-
tially reduce controlling creditor conflicts to the point that business-judg-
ment deference becomes plausible to consider. The controlling creditor
could, more easily than ever, obtain options, credit default swaps, and other
investments that give it incentives to maximize the value of the firm overall
and not the value of just one credit layer in the firm (at the expense of
overall firm value).
True, the controlling creditor may not be able to use old-style conflict-
reducing mechanisms of simultaneously holding proportionate interests in
all of the firm’s important credit and equity layers. It is too expensive to do
so when the loan is made, costly for a creditor to hold when the firm is
doing fine, and barred for many institutional creditors. Yet it is too compli-
cated to negotiate such a deal between the debtor and the creditor when
stress befalls the firm. But with modern options and credit default swaps,
the creditor need not hold these parallel instruments from the time of loan
origination and need not negotiate for them with the debtor firm itself.
Rather, the activist creditor, in particular the activist hedge fund that buys a
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slice of debt in the distressed firm, can take on options or write credit de-
fault swaps on the firm’s other debt and equity layers. In this way, the ac-
tivist creditor limits its own conflicts that might lead it to prefer value-
destroying liquidations and transfers. When the activist creditor does so, the
court can be more confident that the activist creditor’s actions were in-
tended to raise the total value of the firm, in the activist’s best business
judgment.
We can consider this reformulation as either a safe harbor for creditors
that comply or as a screen to help induce healthy creditor action. We cannot
be sure how much creditor activity today benefits the enterprise and how
much shifts value inside the enterprise, although we now have some data
indicative of both being in play. Moreover, even if the behavior were now
good overall, a bright-line permission for creditors would prompt more neg-
ative behavior. And a bright-line ban, if we thought that current creditor
activity was largely negative, would stymie potential innovation. An advan-
tage of the rule we propose is that we need not know right now the relative
weight of good and bad creditor behavior. The overlay of corporate law du-
ties on the creditor-control problem gives us a doctrinal solution, and the
new finance in capital markets gives us the possibility of on-the-ground
practical implementation. Creditors who use the offered safe harbor could
intervene to improve firm value. If there are no such creditors, or none that
are willing to pay the capital costs of doing so, then the ongoing, muddy
rules will govern their actions.
We hardly think that the capital market, corporate law mechanism we
have outlined here is the only means to improve on failing firm decision-
making. The emergence of the rapid § 363 sale in bankruptcy, often a sale to
a dominant creditor, is an alternate way for creditors to replace incumbent
managers. One could also focus on better motivating the board of the failing
firm (perhaps by having them obtain those vertical strips and tying their
incentives into the case law on board duties of failing firms). Courts could
also reexamine whether their baseline rules on creditor conduct could be
improved. That other efforts may be valuable does not preclude the capital
market, corporate law approach from being valuable as well.
* * *
We have here reanalyzed a longstanding, difficult problem of the proper
standard for governing creditor action regarding distressed firms. We have
shown why the transactional problem persists, is severe, and is still doctri-
nally unresolved. The doctrines are not just messy and contradictory but
also fail to address themselves to the critical problem of encouraging the best
management of distressed firms in volatile markets. We believe that we have
shown for the first time how the creditor conceptualizations compare unfa-
vorably with the corporate law conceptualization that deals with similar
problems, how the two deal with those similar problems differently, and
how the corporate conceptualization can be used to better analyze the
problems of creditor intervention in debtor affairs. And we believe that we
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have also shown for the first time how such an improved conceptualization
can be made real by using modern capital market instruments to channel
the incentives of new players in financial markets.
A long history of boardroom corporate law doctrine aims to make the
boardroom a neutral, unbiased decisionmaker, one that can balance the in-
terests of all affected by the corporation. Delaware corporate courts have
made strong efforts during the past decades to make board duties, liabilities,
and business-judgment deference facilitate better decisionmaking when the
firm is in distress.132 Under our approach, the critical decisionmaker is
deeply interested, with much money, investment, and value on the line and,
hence, may have an advantage over the neutral board when the firm is dis-
tressed. But that advantage has long been thought to be countered by the
creditor’s undeniable and historically irremediable conflicts of interest. Our
structural goal here is to make its interest correspond as much as possible to
the total value of the corporation, a goal that is now viable. We can reduce
the persistent doctrinal and fairness problems of the actions of a controlling
creditor in a distressed firm, while simultaneously increasing the chance that
the distressed firm will be better run. We have outlined how this could be
done, by using core corporate law doctrine to bring forth a correct usage of
modern capital markets to reduce creditor conflict and enhance creditor in-
centives in managing distressed firms.
132. See Prod. Res. Grp., L.L.C. v. NCT Grp., Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004);
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ’ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 789 (Del. Ch. 1992); Credit Lyonnais Bank Ne-
derland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
